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JPRS L/9262 20 August 1980

# Near East/North Africa Report



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JPRS L/9262

20 August 1980

# NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

(FOUO 31/80)

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

EUROPE'S POSITION ON ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE EXPLAINED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-ARABI in Arabic 14-20 Jun 80 pp 36-38

[Article: "Europe Reads the Palm of the Middle East: Collapse of the Camp David Strategy; Israeli Invasion of Lebanon; Arab Oil Embargo; New Soviet Progress"]

[Text] Europe is not convinced that the Camp David strategy has expired. It wants to come forward with an initiative which it characterizes not as a substitute for American initiative, but rather as a back-up for it which will take over the job of "moving the issue" during Carter's absence from the scene due to his preoccupation with the election campaign.

Just a few hours prior to the convening of the Common Market summit in Venice, it was still not known whether the European initiative concerning the Middle East would take the form of a substitute for the Camp David formula.

However, it was clear in advance that the Europeans world lose their momentum at the threshhold of the American-Israeli gate if they let themselves be talked into issuing an announcement which does not include a well defined initiative.

While Israel sent its foreign minister Yitzhak Shamir--whose face is no less sullen than that of President Begin--to the European capitals, Carter was severe and demeaning to European pride when he threatened his allies that he would use veto power against any initiative or resolution in the UN Security Council calling for recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination.

Therefore, observers expected that under the best of circumstances the European announcement which was to be issued Wednesday 11 June or Thursday 12 June would include recognition of the PLO based on the "accomplished fact," a call for the direct participation of the PLO in the search for peace, reaffirmation of the previous European position on the right of the Palestinians to self-determination, and, perhaps, their right to a national home or state as well.

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The Americans tried to anticipate the situation and head off the European effort by pushing the Egyptians and Israelis into resuming the autonomy talks which had been stalled since May. Egypt hurried to announce that it had learned of American "ideas" on a search for the means which would lead to the removal of the obstacles standing in the way of a resumption of the talks. President Sadat and his foreign minister, Kamal Hasan 'Ali, expressed strong enthusiasm for the new American initiative.

It is clear that the intention behind the American "ideas" was nothing more than to disturb the European summit in Venice and remind it that the Camp David accords were still alive.

Although the details of these ideas have not been announced, official Egyptian and Israeli statements indicate that they do not deal with the essential subject of the talks, which is Palestinian autonomy. Instead, they concentrate only on one peripheral issue, namely the "measures" pertaining to the resumption of the talks, which will get underway in a preparatory session to be held by the Egyptian negotiators in Washington.

It is known that the talks collapsed when the Israelis asserted that there was no room for discussion of the future of Jerusalem because it has already beer "unified" and has become the "eternal capital" of Israel. They also confirmed their intention to continue their policy of establishing settlements in the West Bank.

Sadat's Negotiating Position

Here it would appear that Sadat's negotiating position is hopeless from the start. For in spite of the fact that he says he is willing to resume the talks without prior (Israeli) conditions, American Secretary of State Edmund Muskie confirmed the "acceptability" of the Israeli conditions when he announced in advance that Jerusalem must not be divided (meaning that its two halves must remain under Israeli authority) and that the United States is opposed to any effort to use the autonomy talks to lay the foundation for the creation of an "independent Palestinian state."

But why does Washington want to head off European intervention?

Bogged down in the election battle, Carter is a prisoner of the "Zionist lobby," not to mention the fact that he considers the Camp David accords the centerpiece of his foreign policy "victories." Therefore, he considers any initiative which seeks to go beyond these accords a personal attack against him.

The American press has launched a slander campaign against the "grim allies" and has begun accusing the Europeans of betraying America, putting Middle East oil before it, and moving toward "neutrality" on the assumption that American power has waned following the Soviet subdual of Afghanistan and the failure of the American military operation to rescue the hostages in Iran.

Europe and the Comprehensive Solution

For their part, the Europeans are moving toward the belief that the time has come to put forward an initiative aimed at a comprehensive solution in the Middle East.

They feel it is possible to pave the way for such a solution by submitting to the Security Council a draft resolution which would be considered a supplement or amendment to UN resolution 242 of 1967, which contains a call for Israel to withdraw from the occupied lands in return for secure borders.

The proposed amendment that Europe is promoting includes confirmation of the Palestinians' rights to self-determination and the establishment of their own state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

However, there is disagreement among the Common Market states as to recognition of the PLO. While major states (e.g., France and Italy) support complete official recognition of the PLO, the small states oppose this. Britain, on the other hand, is taking a cautious appraoch. It supports the European initiative, but only as long as it does not include official recognition of the PLO, because British "diplomatic traditions" prevent it from giving diplomatic recognition to organizations.

The European initiative is based on three main principles:

- 1. Reviving the incentive to arrive at a comprehensive settlement in place of the partial settlements represented by Kissinger's famous "disengagement" by steps and the subsequent Camp David accords (the Egyptian-Israeli treaty).
- 2. Broadening the Camp David formula.
- 3. Investigating the possibilities for European participation in the attainment and implementation of a comprehensive settlement.

The Europeans feel that recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination could bring about a decrease in the tension in the Middle East. At the same time, they remain unopposed to setting in motion a European-Arab "political" dialog. The dialog between the two sides has been stalled since the latter part of 1978 when the Europeans insisted that discussion be limited oil issues and economic cooperation while the Arabs insisted that political affairs and the participation of the Palestinians in the dialog be included.

The European Initiative, a Back-Up to Camp David

The Europeans rebut the American charges of "betrayal" and "disturbance" of the Camp David process by asserting that their initiative is in fact a back-up or underpinning for the American initiative. They say that they want to prepare for the eventual failure of the Camp David approach, or

for the stimulation of the Middle East issue from now until next November-i.e., while Carter is preoccupied with the election campaign and paralyzed by Zionist and Israeli pressures.

Pessimistic European Picture of the Situation

Western Europe is extremely pessimistic about developments in the Middle East situation. It believes that the Camp David approach has reached a dead-end and that the coming round of autonomy talks are doomed to failure as well.

Such being the case, the situation contains signs of danger and many possibilities threaten it. Israel is taking advantage of Carter's pre-occupation with the election campaign to invade Lebanon and deal a crushing blow to the Palestinian resistance in an attempt to get rid of the military base which constitutes the foundation and source of its political and diplomatic strength.

This invasion has prompted a violent Arab reaction, and this is reflected in the Europeans' fear of a total Arab oil embargo which would have a major impact on Western Europe. The Soviets may use this opportunity to achieve another advance in central Asia toward the Persian Gulf. Such a move would be met by further developments in the different Arab situations, involving either internal political changes or a closer approach toward Moscow at the expense of Western interests.

Will the Departure of Begin Solve the Problem?

Europe is now tacitly hoping for the fall of the Begin government, because it believes that his obstinacy has brought about the failure of the Camp David approach, and that his settlement policy has inflamed the West Bank. Moreover, Begin aroused the Europeans' anger by rebuking them collectively and alleging that they had cooperated with Hitler in the campaign to "exterminate the Jews."

Nevertheless, the European capitals do not feel that the fall of the Liberal government and the coming to power of a Labor government will solve the problem. This is because Perez and Rabin, the two leaders of the Labor Party, believe that it is possible to settle the Palestinian problem with Jordan, even though Jordan has asserted in advance that the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinians, and it does not wish to abandon this stance because it has one and a quarter million Palestinians who are increasingly sensitive about any Arab policy that contradicts the announced official lines.

As for the Gulf countries, they are apparently making intensive diplomatic efforts to encourage the Europeans to come forward with an initiative as an alternative to Camp David. French President Giscard d'Estaing and British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington returned from their trip to

the Middle East more convinced than ever before that a European move is needed to forestall an increase in the possibilities of an outbreak of disturbances in the area if the Israelis remain obstinate in their position.

However, Egypt and Israel oppose such an initiative—the first tacitly and the second openly. They have made joint diplomatic efforts to dissuade the Europeans from launching any initiative that goes beyond the American effort. Nevertheless, President Sadat says publicly that Egypt is not against a European initiative as long as it does not conflict with the Camp David line.

As for the European reaction to the America accusations, the Europeans now say frankly that what is good for America is not necessarily good for Europe. This is because Washington does not watch out for European interests, especially when it comes to dependence on Middle East oil and the area's markets. The latter provide European companies with extensive opportunities for the marketing of European products and the implementation of multibillion-dollar contracts.

Europe complains of the fact that the United States has in the past made decisions on its own, considering itself a leader for the Arab world. As former French foreign minister Michel Joubert put it, the United States has "decided for us rather than with us, and asked for our agreement rather than our advice."

America has no choice today but to accept cooperation and give up leadership. But will America take the advice of the Europeans, particularly with regard to the Middle East?

Or will Israel and the Zionist lobby in back of it continue to push America to the point of depriving the area of all hope and destroying it completely?

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ITALIAN MAGAZINE REPORTS ON OPEC LONG-TERM STRATEGY DRAFT

LD071513 Milan L'EUROPEO in Italian 5 Aug 80 pp 24-27

[Report by Mark Nicholson: "A Few Ideas for Fleecing the World"]

[Text] The world of oil, already unstable by its very nature, has been characterized for some time by deep uncertainty with respect to a fundamental problem: that of the producing countries' long-term strategy. What do they wish to achieve with their oil and with the huge amount of money which it places in their hands? Do they have primarily political objectives, connected with the Palestinian issue? Or are they seeking, like all countries in the world, to use their natural resources to increase their prosperity and their level of economic development?

Since the early seventies—that is, since the time when oil prices increased fourfold—OPEC, whose members produce almost half of the world's arude, has been asked these questions with growing insistence. In the discussions which have taken place in international forums since that time, many people have accused OPEC of creating a monopoly and of taking by the throat curtomers who cannot do without oil. OPEC has replied that oil does not reconstitute, once extracted, and that the producing countries have therefore no choice but to develop their economies by securing the necessary resources or to plunge back into poverty; it adds that low prices would encourage consumption and would cause the oil to run out before a suitable substitute has been found.

However, these have always been uncertain and short-term replies. Yet as far back as 1978, OPEC assembled in its strategic committee some of its best brains, coordinated personally by Saudi Oil Minister Shaykh Zaki Yamani—a key man in the Arab world. However, the results of its work remained strictly secret until a draft strategic document met with criticisms from Libya and Algeria at a recent meeting in Algeria, albeit for reasons connected more with the alinement of power in the Arab world than with its content. The secrecy began to crumble and, following the publication of some abridged summaries, a very well informed British financial journal (THE INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY REVIEW) and L'EUROPEO today possess the document drafted by OPEC's strategic

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committee. Or rather, they possess a copy of the original itself; a typed copy of other copies, almost illegible, lacking a page and with very many textual uncertainties. It is the first long-term proposal to emanate from the oil-producing countries, and it is therefore a document which makes it possible to decipher today the future awaiting both the industrialized world and the developing countries.

The document opens with the chilling forecast of a major energy crisis even before 1985. Four factors "serve to confirm the most pessimistic of forecasts, which places the energy crisis even before 1985." The first two factors are of a political nature: The Iranian revolution, which has drastically reduced that country's output, and the decision by Saudi Arabia, OPEC's biggest producer, "to conserve its resources and to limit its output to 8.5 million barrels per day (about 425 million tons per year)." The other two factors are incidents which have rekindled ecological opposition to the creation of new energy sources: the serious breakdown at the Harrisburg nuclear power plant in the United States and the blowout in the Bay of Campeche in Mexico.

In light of these developments, the consumer countries, meeting at the Tokyo and Venice summits, decided to reduce oil imports as much as possible. But the OPEC document comments coldly: "It remains to be seen whether these commitments and aims are really practicable." However, the OPEC countries do not intend under any circumstances to produce more than 35 million barrels per day, as Western forecasts unanimously require.

This strategy of limiting output is obviously connected with the pricing strategy. The OPEC countries finally state their long-term objective: "To use the income produced by a finite resource (oil) to start an independent process of economic development with a high and balanced level of economic activity." How, in real terms? OPEC proposes for oil a "base price which will guarantee not only the maintenance of the price of oil against inflation but also increase in keeping with world economic activity." This minimum price should be adjustable on the basis of three parameters -- inflation, the fluctuations of the dollar and the increase in the industrialized countries' income. But "it is not sufficient to keep the price stable in real terms," as would result from the application of the first two parameters: "A gradual increase in real terms is also necessary.... The real trend in the industrialized countries' income not only reflects their ability to absorb (oil) price increases but also indicates a trend toward high energy consumption, with potential pressures on supply." This is tantamount to saying: If the customer gets richer, let him pay more.

"In practice," the OPEC strategic document continues, "the annual increase in monetary terms should exceed 10 percent. Such an active price movement would mean that prices would double in monetary terms in less than 7 years."

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Having clarified the aims and the possible price formulas with which to achieve them, it was necessary to define the international political conditions, in a complex and variegated scenario in which OPEC fears isolation more than anything else. First of all, the document tackles the greatest problem: that of relations between oil-producing countries and developing countries—the only ones which can offer OPEC adequate political and propaganda support in its confrontation with the industrialized countries. This support determines whether OPEC is regarded by world public opinion as a group of unscrupulous profiteers, operating from a natural monopoly position, or as the spearhead of a great movement of world redistribution of wealth.

To understand how some Western circles view this maneuver by OPEC vis-avis the developing countries, it is sufficient to see how the above-cited British journal entitles the article setting out the document: "This Is OPEC's Secret Plan for Fleecing the Entire World." So this is a matter of crucial importance, to which the strategic committee has devoted considerable time and effort. First of all, there is a list of "common objectives" of OPEC and the developing countries, such as "helping the developing countries to meet their energy needs through the development of domestic resources," "promoting economic and commercial cooperation even outside the oil sector," "achieving an increase in aid from the industrialized countries," and "changing the world economic order to make it more just and efficient." In order to achieve these aims, OPEC rattles off a series of political statements, which are vague, however, and no different from those emanating from time to time from the Western countries' governments. OPEC needed something more, and its strategic committee went into detail, meticulously classifying in three main categories the aid which it is offering the developing countries.

The first point is the "security of oil supplies," in other words "preferential treatment for the developing countries as regards supply security. In times of shortage the OPEC member countries should agree to do this."

The second point is contriving to enable poor countries to pay increased oil prices. "The developing countries should be grouped into three categories according to income, level of economic development and quantities of oil imported," the document explains. The first group includes 33 countries with a per capita income less than \$300, each importing 10,000 barrels of oil per day (500,000 tons per year). OPEC is offering these countries long-term interest-free credits or even written-off loans to cover all future increases in oil prices. The second group comprises 38 countries which have a per capita income lower than \$1,000 and import more than 10,000 but less than 100,000 barrels per day: They are being offered long-term loans with a written-off component equal to 25 percent of the whole. The countries in the third group, of which the document mentions Singapore, Cuba, Thailand, the Philippines, India, Taiwan, Turkey, South Korea and Brazil, have a per capita income of more than

\$1,000 and import more than the previous group. They are offered mediumterm loans on market terms.

The overall cost of the aid program laid out in this point is calculated as \$3,375 million or \$2 for every barrel imported by the developing countries. Of this sum, \$2.6 billion, in other words 77 percent of the total, would be loans on market terms; \$735 million (20.2 percent) would be long-term credits with a \$184-million component written off; \$40 million (2.75 percent) would be actual written-off contributions. In all written-off aid amounts to \$224 million. It is difficult to evaluate this figure since the calculation is based on rather unrealistic hypotheses; however, it does not seem very generous if you consider that in 1979 the OPEC countries earned \$199 billion from oil sales and that, according to the International Settlements Bank's calculations they had a combined balance of payments surplus totaling \$63 billion.

The third point is aid for the development of internal energy sources. GPEC could help at least 36 developing countries to find their own resources, financing geological and geophysical research and exploratory drilling at its own risk. OPEC's aid would not be limited to hydrocarbons but would, for instance, also relate to geothermal and hydroelectric energy. Obviously OPEC alone cannot assume the task of providing all the necessary finance. The scope and intensity of the aid will ultimately have to be defined in cooperation with the industrialized countries and the international bodies. The document takes up the Iraqi proposal for "a combined fund for energy and development to which the industrialized countries should contribute according to the inflation they export to the developing countries; while OPEC should contribute on the basis of future price rises and the quantity of oil exported to these countries."

Having reached this point the tone of the document changes. It moves from a fraternal and even paternalistic attitude to the developing countries to much harsher and more derisive tones for the industrialized countries. It begins with a short historical account. "Up till 1971-1972 the industrialized countries' governments were in general well content to leave the problem of quantity and price of oil in the hands of the big companies. Later, there was an outright revolution and the industrialized countries did everything they could to establish formal relations with OPEC in order to discuss, and, if possible, negotiate or regulate through agreement problems such as the oil price and the future development of supplies. The reaffirmation and exercise of sovereign rights and complete control and management of the various aspects of exploiting oil reserves by the oil-exporting countries during the seventies represented a fundamental change. It represented the transition from dependence to interdependence in relations among oil-exporting countries and industrialized countries."

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The OPEC countries now depend on oil as a source of exports and income. Their present power is, however, based only on the availability of their oil, and the exhaustion of their reserves would also signal the end of their power to influence international events and defend their interests at international level. Only a rapid economic development capable of placing them on a par with the most advanced countries could give them power and prestige after their oil is exhausted. However, at present the OPEC countries have scarcely started their development, and their position influences their international role in respect of their ability both to draw up and to implement an effective strategy. For instance, they have not succeeded in either drawing up or implementing an industrial development strategy based on oil by a rapid and massive entry into the refining and petrochemical industries. On the financial plane, too, their presence in international bodies has not changed either the structure or the strategy of these bodies, which are still tied to the industrialized countries' interests. The document summarized this complex situation, analyzed, as can be seen, not without signs of self-criticism, in a sentious sentence which deserves to be cited in its rather doubtful but colorful English: "Oil power on its own has not delivered the new international economic order." [in English in original]

The industrialized countries however need vigorous technological progress and a change in their energy structures to reduce their dependence on OPEC oil. Essentially, for these countries, "dependence on OPEC exports above all means uncertainty about supply conditions—quantity and prices—of imported oil. There seems to be a general consensus among the indus—trialized countries that OPEC's oil should be regarded as a reserve source of energy which, in other words, would meet requirements which could not be satisfied from other sources and which should hence be offered on the market to satisfy consumer needs. However, this concept implies that oil supplies fluctuate without taking any account of the oil—exporting countries' economic and financial needs or their future energy requirements."

Although it is true that the two groups of countries have "reciprocal interests," it is also true that this reciprocity is asymmetrical: "While the OPEC countries do not stand to gain from destroying the world's industrialized economies, it cannot be said that the industrialized countries have not shown interest in breaking OPEC's unity. In a conflict OPEC would depend less on key imports from industrialized countries than the industrialized countries would depend on OPEC oil imports." Hence at the present stage of the game OPEC has the upper hand.

Going on to analyze in detail "demands and expectations on both sides," the document admits that OPEC is facing two major financial problems. Some OPEC members have surpluses, in other words "that portion of their oil revenue not yet used in financing their economic and social development." If they are placed in the industrialized countries, these funds

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are eaten away by inflation and are subjected to such limitations that their very security is in doubt; therefore it is necessary for the OPEC countries to be able to have access to financial and investment markets "at least on equal terms and conditions to those granted to reciprocal investments among industrialized countries." Other OPEC countries need loans, and the international finance system must be adapted to their requirements, partly by giving the OPEC countries their rightful place as important members of the IMF and the World Bank. OPEC will use these tools partly to obtain an increase in aid to developing countries from the industrialized countries.

OPEC's second main problem is development. Its members must complete the integration of their oil industry, building their own refineries and a petrochemical industry. To do this, as for many other things, they need their products to be accepted by Western countries. These countries should "facilitate OPEC countries' access to their technology, increase oil exploration in OPEC countries by investment and supplying technology and give OPEC countries opportunities to take part in research projects and in training technicians. Finally, the industrialized countries should be encouraged to facilitate greater OPEC presence in their economies and their financial, economic and commercial policies and to take more evident account of OPEC interests."

However, what is the industrialized countries' fundamental interest? According to the document the industrialized countries are more concerned with quantity than with price: "Countries and governments could even stop worrying about oil prices if they could predict the future with more certainty." The OPEC countries should therefore "be able to offer some degree of certainty on oil supplies in order to obtain advantages and benefits on the fronts already mentioned, even if it means producing more than the needs of their economies require, in a spirit of international cooperation."

"A dialog between producers and consumers is inevitable," the conclusion admits; immediately after this, however, it attacks Valery Giscard d'Estaing's mission in the Persian Gulf, accusing him of trying to split OPEC, negotiating only with those members which have an unexploited oil production capacity. In short, a dialog is necessary and the OPEC countries plan to have the developing countries represented in this dialog, too, and to reach agreement with them first; however, this dialog must follow certain rules.

The OPEC strategic committee's document ends here, and there is room for a few comments, limited to highlighting a few fundamental points.

First, with the document presented here the oil-producing countries have made an effort to draw up a long-term strategy, and this is a major contribution to the dialog which the industrialized countries also regard as inevitable. The document contains highly significant admissions; but,

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above all, it should help us enormously to understand the philosophy of those facing us.

Second, there are at least two serious omissions in the document. It does not make an analysis of the stage of development attained by the OPEC countries, of their successes and their outstanding problems; and it disregards the different interests which divide the various member countries owing to the different oil reserves they might possess, their various population densities and the various degrees of ambition in their development objectives. Indeed, the strategic committee's attempt to regard OPEC as a single whole greatly reduces the usefulness of the analysis and the possibility of using it as a guide for understanding the strategy of the countries from which we obtain our oil supplies.

Third, the oil price indexing scheme drawn up by OPEC, or a similar one will eventually be accepted and will lead to an institutionalization of price rises. The Western countries which have still not reduced their energy consumption forecasts and have not yet launched any major conservation campaign no longer have any excuse. By dint of delays they could, therefore, eventually find that they have to accept extremely painful adjustments: adjustments made on income, in other words at the population's expense.

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VARIATIONS OF ISLAMIC DOCTRINE, PRACTICE DISCUSSED

Discussion by Omar S'habou

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 Jul 80 p 29

[Commentary by Omar S'habou--passages between slantlines originally published in italics]

[Text] It is a priori out of the question that the Arab kingdoms could entertain fraternal relations with the Islamic republic of Iran. For Ayatollah Khomeyni, the monarchic principle is by definition anti-Islamic.

Nonetheless, the Arab republics are not benefiting from any favorable predisposition of the new Iranian authorities. For the religious leaders, convinced pan-Islamists such as Montazeri, Beheshti, or Khamenei, /"The days of all the present Arab states are numbered."/ This assertion is based on an almost mystical certitude: /"The Iranian revolution is the beginning of a process that is the will of God and that tends toward the unification of the Muslim world under the authority of a single government!"/

Special Treatment

The Islamic ground-swell thus would not be stopped at Iran's borders, but would sweep away very soon the governments-be they civilian or military, secular or atheistic--ruling Arab societies.

We recall the response of Abolhasan Bani-Sadr to the question which of the present Arab chiefs of state is revolutionary? /"None. Only those political movements which try to install governments that are Islamic in essence and in aim are revolutionary."/

In reality, the Iranian Government seems to have put the Arab states in 3 categories: the kingdoms, /"corrupted"/ in essence and which must disappear; the secular republics (Tunisia, Syria, Yemen) with which

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/"quite normal"/ relations (meaning cool) can be contemplated; and the anti-imperialist regimes which, as such, can benefit from /"objective cooperation"/ with Iran.

For example, Algeria, which is the only Arab state which enjoys some consideration. It takes care of Iranian interests in Egypt and the United States; and an Algerian presided over the international commission to investigate the crimes of the shah. The Iranian and Algerian central banks are engaged in sustained cooperation in the framework /"of the struggle against monopoly of the dollar."/ And President Chadli Bendjedid should soon make his "historic" visit to Tehran.

This special treatment is explained no doubt by the fact that, to avoid total isolation, the Iranian Government has had to choose "the least evil" Islamic partner. Algeria, without being a truly revolutionary state, cuts a figure as an "honorable" partner.

People were rather expecting to see the establishment of a Tripoli-Tehran axis linking the two revolutions describing themselves as Islamic. There is no such axis. /"Proof that we are serious and demanding,"/ Qotbzadeh confided to us. Beyond the fact that they consider the Libyan regime the product of a coup, not of a revolution, the Iranians--religious and civilian--and especially Khomeyni, suspect Qadhdhafi of exploiting Islam as a means to attain his own personal ambitions.

In Iran we sensed a contempt for the Libyan leader. Naturally, realism requires it, Bani-Sadr does not hide the fact that he positively welcomes the solidarity which Libya has shown. He still makes allowances for things. And the Moussa Sadr affair (see J.A. number 1008) is not the only reason.

It is the same with the Palestinian resistance, which is judged by the same criteria. The fact that it struggles against /"Islam's greatest enemy"/ earns it moral support, without giving it a claim to any special status...

Khomeyni called on 'Arafat to describe the Palestinian resistance officially as "Islamic." The leader of the PLO, more than one of whose activists and high-ranking officials are Christian, could not do it. The imam would not have approved...

The Absolute Enemy

Further, the Iranian Government did not hesitate to come down harshly on the PLO bureau in Tehran when the Palestinian organization was minded, in December 1979, to tender its good offices in the hostage affair and when 'Arafat in March 1980 had found it fitting to speak of a possible return to Arab sovereignty of the 3 islets in the gulf occupied by the shah's forces in 1971.

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That is to say, the Iranian authorities, rigorous regarding their principles, have deliberately chosen to direct their policy toward the Arab peoples, going over the heads of the governments in place. The slogans shouted in the course of demonstrations and collective prayers on Friday always distinguish clearly between Arab peoples and Arab regimes; they deny, moreover, any conflicting differences between Shi'ites and Sunnites.

For the moment, Irano-Arab relations seems epitomized by the conflict between Baghdad and Tehran.

Iran is conveying all the grievances which the Arab regimes bring up against Islamic Iran. It is clear that the issue of this conflict will determine over the long run the nature of the relations between a revolution which holds up, in its constitution, the ambition of liquidating the Arab regimes, and these very regimes which do not intend to disappear right away....

Discussion by Mohammed Harbi

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 Jul 80 pp 32-33

[Commentary by Mohammed Harbi--passages between slantlines originally published in italics]

[Text] Following the article by K.S. Nair which appeared in the previous issue, we publish today another critical commentary on the manifesto of Ahmed Ben Bella (see J.A. number 1014). It is by Mohammed Harbi, author of two books on the Algerian revolution ("Origins of the FLN," Editions Bourgeois 1975, and "The FLN: Mirage and Reality," Editions J.A. 1980) and former adviser to the first president of the Algerian republic. Of course the debate will be continued in our next editions.

It is always difficult to respond to the position taken by a political prisoner. The first impulse is rather to support him against those who imprison him. In other words there is a danger, in the debate opened up by JEUNE AFRIQUE, in being taken for an "objective" ally of the jailors against their victim. Any remarks must, therefore, begin by an affirmation that Ben Bella must be set free and allowed to explain himself. I should also like to be permitted to comment on the way JEUNE AFRIQUE made "its" presentation of Ben Bella's text. The cuts made in it undeniably alter the tone and spirit of the manifesto. My comments will refer, then, to the original text, the only one of any value in my mind.

First point: the Manichean view which consists in opposing today the "Islamic renewal"—which is, at bottom, nothing but a controversy over temporal power—against the West taken as an undifferentiated whole (Europe, America, the Eastern countries) is not based on a correct

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understanding of our present and past history. There has never existed an ideologically homogenous Muslim community. Opposing currents have swept through Islam. To schematize, one can discern a current mystical religiosity, a rationalist current open to the enlightenment of progress, and a current inspired by the Ulemas concerned with the compromise of religion and power. What is there in common between the Ghazali of "Ihya 'Ulum Al-din," Ibn Khaldoun of the "Prolegomenas" and the Imam Malek of "El Muwatta"? For the West to exclude the Islamic tradition and the Muslim community, and to reject all rationalist demands, would be an error just like asserting that only the rationalist tradition is authentically Muslim, the other being rejected as heresy.

From the point of view of Islam, there is no reason to see Khomeyni as more Muslim than the Algerian Abdellatif Soltani, the declared enemy of Nasser, Boumedienne, Ben Bella, and Qadhdhafi. I remember that Ben Bella used to speak of Ibn Khaldoun once upon a time. So let us be Khldounians and cunningly set up the political problems by turning ourselves toward the social realities behind them.

The structural and endemic discontent which is found in all predominantly Islamic societies is explained by historical factors. If one considers it in its social context, it is the result of the failure of nationalist leaderships which came to power starting in the Fifties. These leaders promised to make things different, to achieve liberty, equality, and well-being, to eliminate a dependent relationship to imperialism. Their policies, pursued under the aegis of military bureaucracies and the bourgeois classes, resulted in absolutism, in the exacerbation of misery and class inequalities, as well as in grave compromises with imperialism. They added to the disarray of the despised and downtrodden masses, who oscillate between withdrawal into the past and dreaming of the future. The widespread protest, under the banner of religion, primarily overlays an elementary egalitarianism; with a pinch of social policy and a good dose of activism. The increasing dislocation of the social framework, insecurity, and distress which have resulted have restored force and credit to the irrational. There is not then, as some would have us believe, an Islamic renewal, but a resurgence of the obscure forces of feeling and instinct which will lead neither /"beyond the old order of things"/ nor to a new social order.

Second point: to merge the North-South conflict with the conflict between Islam and the West is to err doubly. First of all because one thus substitues for a conflict with a historical and economic basis another which, in a certain sense, has no history; that of a Christian West at one with itself since the Crusades, and one Islam (the Muslim societies), in permanent warfare. Next because one is yielding to the ever-present temptation to transform internal contradictions into a struggle between a homogenous and pure community and, on the outside, one which is foul and menacing. Here we are in the presence of a projection phenomenon whose

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extension--the Iranian example shows this well--can only be an activism without a firm hold on the real.

Third point: regarding the failure of the Arab and Muslim countries, Ben Bella passes in silence the culpability of generations which came to power under the flag of nationalism, whether they speak of socialism under peasant leadership (Algeria), of Arab unity (Egypt, Syria, Iraq) or of the restoration of the Muslim city (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia). And it is on this point that debate could have been most fruitful. For example, one would have loved to see Ben Bella describe his own experience and that of Algeria.

In Iran (under the shah), in Egypt, in Algeria, the regimes in place began by depicting themselves as the model of economic rationality: so that to the eyes of the wretched of the earth they appeared like an extension of the West. One can understand from this why rebellion against the policy of an irresponsible technocracy and its disastrous consequences should take the form of an authenticity which it betrayed. But we all know that talk about development and mastery of technology is only a smoke-screen, as is the Islamic language these governments are beginning to use. The real problem is not the diversity of ideologies, but in the reality of the social struggle between the holders of power and those which it oppresses.

Fourth point: Ben Bella stresses the harmfulness of the single-party[state] and the need to take into consideration ethnic and cultural diversity. He extols broad self-rule. These objectives are all the more meritorious as they are branded in his flesh. But he does not see--and in this he does not break with the past--that his dispute with Muslim states rests on a mystic populism, rooted in a unilateral interpretation of Islam and thus threatens to lead to more of the governments he denounces. In conclusion, he will always be, as he already is, among his enemies of yesterday and today, men who will know better than he and who in opposing him will make themselves the spokesmen of this "Islamic renewal," free to point out that, from the time he himself was in power, he spoke the language of economic rationalism. Intolerance is lying in wait. Let us beware of supporting it.

Discussion of Mohamed Charfi

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Jul 80 pp 38-39

[Commentary by Mohamed Charfi, professor at the University of Tunis]

[Text] Following the articles by K.S. Nair and M. Harbi (J.A. numbers 1019 and 1020), here are the views of another intellectual on Ahmed Ben Bella's profession of faith (J.A. number 1014).

The faith of Algerians was the cement of their union and the catalyst of their revolution. Islam has played a fundamental role in the expulsion of the colonizer and in building a national sense of identity. Besides, as

it lasted a long time, the Algerian revolution cost the popular masses dearly and had to acquire, thanks to these enormous sacrifices, an advanced social content.

## Ideological Evolution

In order to create a synthesis of these different elements, the ideology of Ahmed Ben Bella, one of the most prestigious historic leaders of the revolution, was composed of a sort of marriage between Marxism and Islam.

That is to define the interest in reading the document which he was recently able to write after 15 years of enforced silence.

During this time many things have happened. The left has received massive setbacks, caused by the cultural revolution which shackled for so long the march of the Chinese people toward development, the genocide of Pol Pot, the revelations about the Gulag, the occupation of Cambodia, the Sino-Vietnamese war...

Similarly, we have watched as integrism [pan-Arabism] has grown in most of the Muslim countries, and as the Iranian revolution erupted, one of the most important events of our age and one of the most authentic revolutions of the last 2 centuries.

These events seem to have also had a great influence on the ideological evolution of the Algerian president; an evolution which seems to be toward a Third-World populism impelled by disillusion with regard to the Eastern countries and by adhesion to the Iranian revolution.

Revolutions are generally preceded by changes in ideas. The revolution of 1789 was in a sense prepared by Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu, the Encyclopedists...That of 1917 by Marx and his school. The uniqueness of the Iranian revolution, which constitutes at the same time its handicap, is that there the action preceded thought. It is a "reactionary-revolution." Reaction against the system of exploitation of the Iranian people and their riches, against mimicry of the West, against the bloody dictatorship of SAVAK. But the most extreme ambiguity reigned, and still reigns, about the design of the future society. The present trampling about is the result.

## Domination and Frustration

For the moment all we have is the dream of turning back the clock a thousand years to recover Islam's golden age and its time of glory. These dreams were the fruit of decades of arrogant domination by the West, and of the frustration it engendered. They are as understandable as they are unrealizable. It is as if the Church wanted, today, to do battle against atheism, return to the age of the Inquisition, or as if the Latin peoples could set about to implement Roman law. Like the latter, Muslim law is one of the most impressive juridical movements in history. However, as it has not changed in almost 1000 years, while Muslim society has experienced considerable change, it is illusory to wish to reinstate it today without profound modifications.

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Imported Wares

The poverty of contemporary Islamic thought is apparent even without adding to it the question of expedited justice and a return to corporal punishment. To haul up an executioner from the old regime before a revolutionary tribunal, find him guilty in a quarter of an hour, and execute him immediately after, is an act that is hard not to condemn. All revolutions have done this. But to call this "Islamic justice" is an insult to Islam and all Muslims.

It is the same when the so-called Islamic militants oppress their Christiaan compatriots in Egypt. The events at Minieh are in this regard especially disquieting.

All the modern notions of human rights, toleration, universal suffrage, separation of church and state, and of an independent judicial system respectful of rights of the defendant were almost unknown to the ancient civilizations. The West has devoted time to cultivating their acceptance, and even now they are applied only partially. The Muslims need to "digest" them, and above all to give them a content and form which change them from imported wares to a continuation and deepening of their own historic genius, their own civilization.

Attempts at a renovation of Islamic thought have been made by men as celebrated as Jamaleddine el-Afghani or Mohmed Abdou who called for fresh reflection on Islamic sources; by Tahar Haddad who showed that Islam is not opposed to women's liberation; by Ali Abderrazok who argued that the state is a political creation and not of necessity religious, and that a separation between church and state in Islamic countries is not only perfectly possible but even necessary. But these theories, in absence of deeper development have remained isolated. In this regard, the insolvency of contemporary Muslim intellectuals is patent. Most of them are familiar with the most minute historic details about the Russian revolution or the quarrel between Stalin and Trotsky, but are ignorant of the life, the ideas, and even the existence of Abu Dhar el-Ghifari, the prophet's companion and the first Muslim militant for social justice.

The Tunisian Woman and Iran

This enormous gap has led to a situation where today references to Islam attribute to it a certain reactionary or at least conservative cast, whereas the marriage of Islam and progress is perfectly possible. It is even in the nature of things.

Finally, the Code on personal status, the pillar on which rests the emancipation of the Tunisian woman in the framework of Islam, is more basic to a renewal of that faith than are the writings of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Council.

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

PRESS COVERAGE ON OAU SUMMIT MEETING

Discrimination Against African Journalists

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 16 Jul 80 p 5

[Commentary by Sennen Andriamirado]

[Text] An incident little known to the honorable delegates marked the opening of the OAU summit, at the Aberdeen Conference Center in Freetown on 1 July. For 2 whole hours, a horde of journalists was chasing OAU information officials through the corridors. Armed with the special badges that gave access to the gallery reserved for the press, journalists from America, Germany, China, France, Japan, and the Soviet Union—as well as a special envoy from JEUNE AFRIQUE, it must be said—were allowed in. The others, the Africans, bellowed their indignation in the hall. Only 41 seats had been reserved; 6 for the Sierra-Leone press, 35 to the international and African press.

Even if it be true that for journalists the corridors are a more abundant source of news than a meeting hall, the de facto discrimination which hit the African press in Freetown is nevertheless exemplary of the usual behavior of our leaders.

First, fear of the international press. Under the pretext of courtesy toward foreigners, the states, like regional institutions, give them every attention. Second, contempt for African journalists. Under pretext of African hospitality, they are enjoined to yield their seats to their colleagues from abroad. So, at the OAU, they only get badges or passes not used by the Americans or Soviets. At the briefings of the deputy secretary general, the Francophone African journalists clamor in vain for interpreters: the sessions are held in English.

In fairness to the OAU officials, this contempt (unconscious?) only reflects that of the leaders toward their national press contingents, the rule being that the latter should only interest themselves in "their own" delegation. Thus, colleagues from Malagasy were admonished for having photographed Moroccan delegates. Similarly, colleagues from Gabon only turned up at the appearance of minister Martin Bongo.

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By contrast, other journalists—especially Algerians and Moroccans—went beyond the call of duty. From the beginning of the ministerial meeting (18 June) to the end of the summit (4 July), they attended every debate and had access to all the reputedly confidential documents. Because they were registered as delegates. It is true that one of the two was no longer working as a journalist and was sending his dispatches back in code.

After Freetown, Confusion Remains

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 Jul 80 p 5

[Commentary by Abdelaziz Dahmani--passages between slantlines originally published in italics]

[Text] After the tumultuous OAU summit in Freetown, dominated by the Sahara affair, the main protagonists all returned home. Here and there, conclusions were drawn. With some reservations and much self-satisfaction.

In Morocco, the Sunday papers unanimously celebrated the success of the kingdom's delegates. According to OPINION, /"it is Morocco's victory over its critics,"/ and LE MATIN DU SAHARA says that /"the seventeenth summit was a true success for Morocco."/

In Algiers, the tone is more moderate. /"The OAU has taken the wise path,"/assures EL MOUDJAHID. By contrast, for Mohamed Abdelaziz, secretary general of Polisario, /"the SADR [Saharan Arab Democratic Republic] is already the 51st member state of OAU."/

A point of view moderated by Edem Kodjo, who declares that admission of the SDAR, just like the Moroccan demand to know what is a /"sovereign and independent state,"/ remains /"at issue"/ until the wise men speak.

In Antananarivo, Malagasy President Didier Ratsiraka opines that /"the real success of the conference is that Morocco agrees to talk to the POLISARIO!"/ Senegalese President Leopold Senghor, for his part, cites as interested parties, other than POLISARIO, AOSARIO [Association of Natives of Saguia El Hamra and Rio de Oro] and the local elected officials of the new Moroccan provinces.

This is far from being an exhaustive survey of points of view. It suffices to show that, even if the OAU did not disintegrate in Freetown, confusion remains.

'JEUNE AFRIQUE' Behind Closed Doors

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 16 Jul 80 p 12

[Article by J. A.--passages between slantlines originally published in italics]

[Text] Because of the absence of any distribution system or kiosks, JEUNE AFRIQUE was practically unobtainable in Freetown. Everywhere and at every hour every issue of J.A. is read by a dozen readers, none of whom have the means to buy his own paper. At the OAU summit, this rate of readership was well surpassed, except it was heads of state and government, ministers and ambassadors who passed back and forth the rare issues available with the cover story "OAU: Victim of the Sahara." The OAU was truly a victim of it, and the Organization came very close to not surviving it.

## Left and Monarchy

In this hot and heavy atmosphere, the two J.A. special correspondents tried (were they able?) to keep a cool head—and not to react to several provocations...They were not the only ones. Sennen Andriamirado and Abdelaziz Dahmani were among the many who were not privileged to wear the "blue badges", which were the same color as those of the...delegates. But this did not prevent them from learning a good part of what went on.

JEUNE AFRIQUE was cited several times behind closed doors. President Leopold Sedar Senghor paid us this honor, though he was not the only one, when he said: /"...Professor Jean Dresch with another professor, a communist like him, gave the proof in LE MONDE, which is a leftist paper/ (some commotion in the hall) /of the historic rights of Morocco. Obviously, the secretary general of the French Communist Party, Mr Marchais, disagreed with the two professors, but Marchais was being a politician, whereas the two professors were being scientific/ (laughter). /On the other hand, in fact, in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, the European states that wanted to colonize the southern part of Morocco discussed it with Morocco. I refer you to an issue of the review JEUNE AFRIQUE, a leftist review/ (some laughter on the rows of delegates from former Portuguese colonies, Madagascar, and Libya). /Oh yes. Oh yes. A leftist review. There's nothing but Marxist-Leninists on the left/ (applause)/." /"In JEUNE AFRIQUE,"/ President Senghor continues, /"Morocco has been given the nod, and a professor--who is certified, and therefore qualified--has proven that the European states in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries always considered Morocco as exercising its suzerainty. Suzerainty and sovereignty. Now suzerainty is the power of the king, and let us not forget that Morocco is a monarchy. You will tell me this is not progressive! But it happens that in Europe the most democratic and most social-democratic countries are the ones in Scandinavia, under monarchic regimes. It is the pluralism of parties that makes democracy/ (applause)."

The following day, 4 July, and still behind /closed doors/, Mr Ali Triki, the Libyan foreign minister, blames President Senghor for events in Chad: /"Perhaps Senghor is also going to tell us that LE FIGARO is a leftist newspaper, as he said yesterday that JEUNE AFRIQUE is a leftist paper..."/

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## Recriminations

At that instant, a voice was heard that broke up the delegate ranks: /"Beware of Qadhdhafi, he kills"/ an allusion to a recent cover of J.A. (rumber 1016), which triggers smiles and applause, proof if any were needed that this issue of JEUNE AFRIQUE was not overlooked.

During the summit, the 2 special correspondents from J.A. were subjected by the participants to much more recrimination than praise. /"Why such criticism?", "such an article," "such an accusation"?/ The Senegalese delegation did not lag behind: it did not appreciate two recent articles, one being termed /"misinformed,"/ the other /"hostile."/ These criticisms owed nothing to the left-right split. But almost all of them were upset at not being able to get "their own" paper, including and especially those who do not like it and ban it in their own countries.

A delegate from a country where J.A. is not available was even so bold as to wear a T-shirt bearing the inscription: /"I get my news from J.A."/. Summoned urgently by his chief of state, he quickly slipped on a shirt over it...that was a bit too transparent. In order not to irk his "boss," he added a silk neckerchief to complete the camouflage...

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NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS

TUNISIA CONTINUES POLICY PLANNED FOR ARABS, AFRICANS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Jun 80 pp 1549-1550

[Editorial: "Without Thrusting Aside the Thought of a Reconciliation With Libya, Tunis Intends To Keep its Arab and African Policy Active"]

[Text] Less than 4 months after the Gafsa affair, Tunisia is envisaging a reconciliation with Libya but it is only engaging upon this course very prudently, even with reservations. In this connection it is actually the Libyan state which is the plaintiff. As early as on 25 April Jadallah Azouz at Talhi, secretary of the general committee of the Libyan Jamahiriyah, sent a congratulatory message to Mohamed Mzali, who had just been put in charge to form the Tunisian Government.

A communication from Tripoli reads as follows: "We are ready to renew fraternal relations between the two countries, such as they existed formerly, and to go beyond all the problems which the regionalists and the spiteful have tried to create between our two people" (text of the Libyan JANA news agency). This message also expressed the hope that the Djerba declaration signed by Colonel Qadhdhafi and President Bourguiba, be put into a concrete form, under Mohamed Mzali's government.

Mohamed Mzali seems to have replied to this message only on 7 May. However, in the meantime, during the Lagos conference on 28 or 29 April, the Tunisian premier had been approached by the Libyan secretary of foreign affairs. On 28 May Mzali states his point of view on this matter to the Arabic newspaper, AL MOSTAQBAL, which appears in Paris: "Responsible Libyans have expressed their wish to turn the page. As for us we feel that the wounds must be healed. However, as a matter of politics, the future must always be envisaged. If responsible Libyans show their good faith, make practical decisions to reform the climate by especially finding the solutions to the problems of the training camps in which Tunisians are enrolled, as well as to the situation which exists in regard to Tunisian

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workers in Libya, accept a just solution on the subject of the continental plateau and consider unity as a long term objective for its fruition, in which the efforts of present and future generations must be combined, all this in the framework of sincere cooperation in the interest of both parties in the economic, social and cultural field, in a concerted action and neighborly relations far from the interference in other people's business, I would personally wish to see the page turned over."

There is, therefore, no hurry on the Tunisian side. It will be noted that Bourguiba has been very secretive as to his plans. It should be recalled that in June 1977 it was Bourguiba who had personally taken the initiative for a reconciliation, although it is true that that was on the day after Colonel Qadhdhafi had made a speech in which he had perceived an inclination towards a rapprochement. But it is only on that level that the problem could be dealt with usefully.

Eventual cooperation for the solution of Saharan and Palestinian problems.

In the same interview with AL MOSTAQBAL, Mohamed Mzali summarizes his conceptions in the matter of Arab policies. To begin with he underscores that Tunisia, in accordance with the actual terms of its constitution, is an integral part of the Great Arab Maghrib; he himself is a citizen of "Maglarib" since his early youth, and he is persuaded that the future of the Arab Maghib lies in integration...but it will take time, can only be realized after many generations and this will not be accomplished just with words), but by means of a long term effort."

Recalling that Tunisia has not recognized the POLISARIO, he confirms that he has good relations with Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania and adds that he will make every effort to "broaden and diversify cooperation with those states." President Bourguiba, in September 1979, had made an overture to Morocco and Algeria and "we are ready to take all the necessary initiatives, if the parties concerned wish it."

Declaring forcefully that, according to president Bourguiba and all Tunisians, "Israel is the oppressor of the 20th Century" and "that the international community could not be at peace with its conscience as long as it remains indifferent to the millions of Palestinians who have been driven out of their country." Mzali confirms that Tunisia is "resolved to contribute to the settlement of this problem with all the means at its disposal."

Liberal proposals.

AL MOSTAQBAL also asks Mzali if his government intends to carry national reconciliation into effect. The prime minister replying at length, in a very appropriate tone, pointed out that Tunisia "lives under a presidential regime," and that in accordance with the president's wish everything will be done to improve the climate and for "every Tunisian to be able to work in freedom and dignity"; the party relying not only on a narrow elite but also on the masses and retaining its effectiveness.

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Islamic integrism does not seem, according to Mzali, to constitute a problem in Tunisia at the present time; everything must be done in order that the religious faith does not become oriented to fanaticism and that religion is not exploited for political ends.

Manifesting again a moderate liberalism towards the students, which he has always displayed toward them, Mzali noted that it is in their nature to be challenging and declared that he "was not at all disturbed to see them initiate the election of a free student organization endowed with its own individuality. Just as broad a viewpoint is manifested in regard to the union movement: Mzali wishes for "free and democratic elections" in view of the next UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor] congress, "a congress which we wish to be free in order to let a leading representative of the people emerge."

From an outside observer's viewpoint, Mzali's liberal proposals cannot be doubted, but it remains to be seen by what means he proposed to carry them to fruition.

Everyone will agree that the Moslem integrist upsurge is not as accentuated in Tunisia as in Egypt or even Algeria; nevertheless it has made appreciable progress recently and simple declarations of intention will not be sufficient to check it.

As to the student and union problems, their solution through the means of general elections would in fact be quite correct, but what preparations will be made for these elections to be at the same time really free and sufficiently representative? It is evident that if the new student and union leadership elected was contestable, we would be headed once more towards serious difficulties.

Invitation to concrete development action.

Mzali's preoccupations are not limited only to the needs of the external and internal Tunisian policies. On 7 May, in Tunis, when he opens the third session of the Arab Council of Ministers for Youth and Sports, as he had done on 28 April when speaking before the Economic Congress in Lagos, the Tunisian premier intends to mark Tunisia's original place in the Arab world as in the African Continent.

When Mzali examines the resources for the coordination of action and efforts, before the Arab ministers for Youth, he insists forcefully on the virtue of modesty which makes it possible to elude presumption and intransigence; it appeared as though this was a discreet warning addressed to Libya. However, this Tunisian statesman does not insist particularly, since this is an active and positive style which he proposes, before everything else, to recommend to the session: "Let us leave the doors wide open to hope for Arab youth. Let us spare them the contradictions which the adults are enduring. The young must be convinced that pride dwells in positive action, the gift of himself and the attachment to moral values."

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But the pedagogue reappears behind the statesman:

"We take pleasure in celebrating unity and arabism, but in reality, and particularly among the young, we hardly know one another. Young Arabs, after 6 years of primary instruction, and seven years in secondary education ratified by the general certificate of education (advanced level), have a very modest and quite insufficient knowledge of the Arab world."

In Lagos, before the chiefs of state and of African governments, Mohamed Mzali makes similar remarks:

"Development is at first a knowledge essentially oriented to a better understanding of ourselves, of our socioeconomic milieu, and of our real needs." Thanks to "an African ability springing from our own authenticity, we could, added Mzali, attain the sensitive adequacy between training and development...(and achieve) an African balance between man, earth, society, economic space and the cultural era."

Finally, extending to the entire continent a Tunisian formula used by his predecessor, Hedi Noura, the Tunisian prime minister suggests "the establishment of a specifically African contract for development and civilization designed: 1) to put forward the aspirations of the African man as well as the characteristics of his society and his environment; 2) define the general principles in economic matters on a bilateral, subregional, regional and international plan; 3) specify the objectives of African development on the basis of collective autonomy, people's influence on their natural and human wealth and the application of our potential to the realization of the African man's well-being; (4) disengage political volition in order for these principles and concepts to attain the necessary force capable of being applied effectively."

This is the constant line of Bourguibian african solidarity policy. Undoubtedly, the Tunisian Government intends to play a more active role in African concerted actions, in which it will make every effort to imprint a more effective mark.

New government participation.

Mohamed Mzali's "manner" is illustrated again by the comments, postponed for a few weeks, he made to AL MOSTAOBAL on the subject of the ministerial reshuffling on 24 April.

Recently, he explained, "the president invited one of his colleagues who belonged to the Destourian group, which had kept at a distance from the party, and entrusted him with a ministerial portfolio, not because he represented a trend of opinion or a group, but because he is a competent Tunisian, a patriot who respects constitutional legitimacy and the republican regime."

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In fact, it is known that Mongi Kooli, Moncef bel Hadj Amor and Abdelaziz Lasram, who resigned in December 1977, had once more rejoined the cabinet in April 1980. The first two are ministers attached to the prime minister, one of them to be the leader of the party, the other has in mind administrative reform; the third is in charge of national economy. Tunisian opinion sees in this selection an inflection towards liberalism. Mzali tempers this evaluation by stating that a trend had not been given any consideration.

Nevertheless, Kooli's manner differs sufficiently enough from Sayah's to get the impression of a change. But the enthusiasm with which Sayah has made the most of his duties in equipment, and the resumption of his journalistic activities as editor-writer for AL AMAL and L'ACTION give proof at the same time of his discipline and his determination not to be brushed aside.

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AFGHANISTAN

STRATEGIST APPRAISES AFGHAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 12-18 Jul 80 pp 34-36

[Article by Gerard Chaliand: "What Can the Afghan Resistance Forces Do?"]

[Text] Gerard Chaliand, a theoretician of guerrilla warfare and a specialist in national liberation movements, was asked by the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London to make an evaluation of the Afghan resistance on the spot. (His report will appear in English in the ADELPHI PAPERS at the end of 1981, and in French in the collection "Strategies" put out by Berger-Levrault.) After spending three weeks in Peshawar, Pakistan, and the province of Paktia, south of Kabul, he supplied the NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR with his initial conclusions.

Two conclusions emerge for the observer studying the Afghan resistance. The first is that it is extremely popular, with massive support from the people, and that weapons rather than manpower are lacking. The second conclusion is that in terms of leadership, organization and coordination, the Afghan resistance is one of the poorest in the modern world.

In fact, for an expert in national liberation movements and armed struggles in the Third World, Afghanistan represents a kind of exception. The main task of the vanguards assuming leadership of the national liberation movements, whether it be in Vietnam, Cuba, Algeria, Guinea-Bissau or elsewhere, is the gradual acquisition, thanks to the organization of a clandestine political infrastructure, of the support of a more or less substantial part of the population.

Nothing like this is found in Afghanistan. The population was spontaneously mobilized, beginning in the spring of 1978 and more particularly after the Soviet intervention at the end of last year, to combat the regimes supported by the USSR and the Soviet military presence. Outside the cities, the major essential communications routes and a series of small fortifications held by the regime thanks to Soviet support, the country is in fact, particularly in the mountains but in the valleys as well, and even in plain daylight, basically in the hands

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of the resistance fighters. Those who are fighting are sons of the people, peasants for the most part, and their local chiefs are the traditional chieftains or notables, religious or otherwise.

In Peshawar, the various movements which make up the resistance--there are more than half a dozen, with three main ones--have no overall strategy, no coordination, and no organization other than the tribal, regional, family and trade links which are classic in traditional societies. The resistance has hardly any program on the political level, no social projects, no vision of the future. In almost all of the guerrilla movements in Asia or Africa, there is always something new to be shown to the observer: the village committee elected, integration of women in the struggle, establishment of dispensaries or schools, newly created people's stores or manufacturing workshops in order to insure a minimum of self-sufficiency. In Afghanistan, there is nothing new to be displayed. There is no political or social innovation. In this regard, there is greater similarity historically with the Basmachi movement, through which, in the course of the 1920's, the Muslims of Bukhara resisted the omnipotence and the innovations of the Soviets, than to any modern guerrilla force.

But the fact is that the imposition of "socialism" by foreign tanks supporting a regime almost without a social base is violently rejected by the Afghan peoples. The religious recourse, like it or not, is to an ideology of resistance and identity, of faithfulness to oneself and society. Afghan nationalism, itself so divided into various ethnic groups, is evidenced--whether it be among the Pathan, Tadzhik, Hazara or Nuristani peoples--as opposition to the occupation, and this war may provide an opportunity for consolidation. One could perhaps even speak of the process of building a nation, since these things occur less through reasonable alliances than a popular struggle against a common enemy, preferably foreign. There is a ferocious insistance on freedom and independence among peoples as little inclined to submit to the state as to a foreign power. With the warrior tradition making a contribution -- a chapter on which it is not necessary to refresh British memories, there is in Afghanistan today a people who, for whatever reasons, will fight spontaneously for the freedom of the individual himself.

## Rival Movements

The organizations representing the resistance in Peshawar—these are Pathan organizations, but one finds therein representatives of all the other ethnic groups in the country, although, excluding the Islamic Party headed by H. Goulboudin, they have formed a coalition (which has taken the name Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan, and is headed by Abdul Sayaaf), do not represent a front but a conglomerate of rival organizations which want to quarrel over aid and to increase,

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as is classic, their representation. The two leading organizations in the coalition are the National Front for the Islamic Revolution in Afghanistan, headed by S. A. Gailani, and H. S. Mojadidi's National Liberation Front. Both these gentlemen belong to great families of religious notables and represent a moderate wing, whereas Goulboudin claims to be more fundamentalist. The other groups are Rabani's Islamic Society of Afghanistan, Mohamedi's Revolutionary Islamic Movement, the Yunis Khalis wing of the Islamic Party (a split from the Goulboudin movement), well-established in the province of Nangrahar, with the special feature that the leader, unlike the others, is in the field. Finally, there is the Revolutionary Islamic and Nationalist Council of Afghanistan, established by Z. K. Nassry. In practice, these are rival movements, in the field as well as on the international Muslim scene. Increasingly, signs of increasing impatience among certain combatants in the interior with regard to these rather vain divisions can be noted. and it is possible that there will soon emerge, within the resistance force itself, the embryo of a new style of representation.

One enters Afghanistan after passing, between Peshawar and the frontier, a half-dozen Pakistani police blocks. These blocks separate the tribal area (Pathan) from the rest of Pakistan, and it is not possible to pass after 1900 hours. The various Afghan organizations ask foreigners who want to enter the country to wear the local costume in order to be noticed as little as possible. Sometimes the Pakistani police arrest journalists and send them back to Peshawar, but generally, getting past the blocks is no great problem.

We spent our last night in Pakistan in the small town of Miramshah, before crossing the frontier of the province of Paktia, headed in the direction of Tani, Khowst and Gardez, a trip of 200 kilometers as the crow flies. In this season, on approaching the Durand line which marks the Afghan frontier, one abandons the moisture of the monsoon season for the cooler mountain air. The landscape in Paktia, unlike that of the other frontier provinces, Nangrahar and Kunar, is wooded. Moreover, camels in caravans carry individual loads of 200 kilograms of wood purchased at 1,500 afghanis (an afghani is worth 10 centimes) and resold, after a dozen days of travel, at 4,000 afghanis. Thus, little by little the province is being deforested and erosion is taking over, as in the rest of the country.

## A Choice of Teas

There is not a moment of solitude on these precipitous paths to which run parallel, down below, trickles of more or less drinkable water. One constantly passes other groups of mujahadin wearing the large Pathan turban with a cock's crest, the long shirt and matching vest under a cartridge belt full of bullets in which the narrow Pathan dagger is stuck, full trousers and leather sandals with soles cut from tires.

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The Afghans are great walkers and their daily march extends up to 10 hours, so that the time left to study the level of the guerrilla force is relatively limited. Sometimes one stops in a "chai kahne," a teahouse constructed of mud. The fact that Afghanistan is a geographic crossroads is reflected in the fact that one finds both Chinese green tea and Indian black tea. Both are drunk in quantity, heavily sugared. The fact is dehydration is considerable and one must balance the energy lost.

If one does not find the abject poverty of the Pakistani population in Afghanistan, one does see there an austerity close to the very minimum. The meals are almost always composed of a kind of unleavened pancake soaked in a sauce. No vegetables or fruits. Meat is a rarity.

The nights are spent either in camps set up by the mujahadin, or in the villages, where the combatants' welcome is always cordial. One if offered tea or whey, and also something to eat.

On the military level, I saw a battle in the course of my stay—an attack on the Leja Post, occupied by the Afghan army, not far from Khowst. The attack, which was launched at 1830 hours, lasted an hour and a quarter, without results. The spectacular operations to which the media have accustomed performance—watchers are rare in guerrilla warfare. Decisive battles are still rarer. It is a question of harassment operations, the leading dimension of which is psychological rather than military, a routine operation in which one reminds the adversary that he is sick, isolated and unable to control the terrain.

There were no casualties on either side, as far as I know, since the efficacy of Kalashnikov weapons against a small fortress and a tank, which sallied forth a few meters to impress the combatants, being nil, as was the blind firing of machine guns and other weapons from the fort against an adversary concealed in the rocky hillside. Any approach to the entrenched camp was made impossible by a mine field.

This battle is consistent with the military equipment of the Afghan resistance force--too many Lee-Enfield and Kalashnikov rifles (made in Egypt), and almost no heavy weaponry. In all I saw one Chinese heavy machine gun, two RPG-2's (individual Soviet antitank weapons) and one mortar. In practice, the offensive capacity of the members of the Afghan resistance force is limited. They cannot take any fortified post. Even approaches to them are made impossible by mine fields. What remains, basically, is harassment of communications, more thanks to mines and explosives than attacks with light weapons, which are ineffective against tanks and helicopters.

From the military viewpoint, the losses in material and men which the resistance fighters can currently impose are very limited, even if the Homeric inclinations of the Afghans tend to convert moderate enemy

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losses into catastrophes. The real situation involves a precarious status quo: The fortified towns and posts held by the Soviets and the Afghan Army are impregnable. Communications can be disrupted but the heavy armored convoys with air cover go where they want. On the other hand, it is out of the question for the forces of order to give chase to the resistance forces, which control the greater part of the countryside and the mountains without challenge.

It is the Pathan tribes native to the southeastern part of the country which were behind the formation of the Afghan state in the middle of the 18th century. In one century, the Pathan ethnic group (40 percent of the population) took over the bulk of the wealth of the country, wheatlands in the north, pasture land in the center, bazaar trade and above all, the state, adminstrative, army and police apparatus.

## Clumsy Reforms

The people of the Khalq, who seized power in April 1978, are also Pathan. But the errors they added one upon another in their desire for modernization, pursued in mechanical fashion, without a specific knowledge of the terrain, has alienated them from the complex of peoples including the Tadzhiks, of Persian origin (about 35 percent). The Nuristani (3 percent) and the Hazaras (10 to 12 percent) are fighting to preserve their relative local autonomy, born of the mountainous nature of their province. The Turkish speaking populations, above all in the region of the Badakhshan province (Uzbek, Turkmen and Kirghiz) are also fighting, as are the Baluch people in the southern part of the country. While the opposition to the shah in Iran came from the urban sector, the opposition in Afghanistan was initially rural and tribal and has crystalized around a rejection of the reforms clumsily pursued by the Khalq people. But the movement has now reached the cities.

Agrarian reform is being pursued on the level of ownership of the land exclusively, with ownership limited to 5 hectares. But it serves no purpose to distribute land in Afghanistan if one does not also distribute water and seeds (see article by Olivier Roy in ESPRIT, May 1980). A number of peasants have found themselves owners of land they could neither plant nor irrigate. And so they went to the former owners of the land to exchange their titles for seed. Another decree prohibited dowries. Now in traditional societies, the dowry, which must be returned by the husband in case of divorce, weighed heavily as a deterrent to repudiation. Another decree made education compulsory for girls, but the state could only provide male teachers, not female. Practicing an "underdeveloped-nation Stalinism" (Maxime Rodinson's expression) in the realm of Marxism, the regime was bound to come up against a population over which the limited cadres had no hold. Very quickly, the leftist putsch which brought the Marxists to power in April 1978 resulted in a triple failure: failure of the state, which was incapable of imposing a

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different order, failure for the reforms due to lack of understanding of the local realities, and economic failure.

The replacement of the Khalq by the Parcham, brought about by the USSR and Soviet intervention, did not resolve the problem. The regime, whatever its desire for reform, came up against the national issue. It is not possible, with the manifest presence of Soviet troops, for it to link nationalism and social demands. The Afghan Army, which had 80,000 men, dissolved, due to desertion or enlistment in the resistance, to the extent of almost two-thirds of its volume, and there cannot remain today many more than 30,000 men. The effort to rally urbanized youth to the flag in May 1980 ended in failure. The rebellion is not localized, as is often the case with numerous liberation movements, in the frontier provinces. If one wishes to take the time, one can reach the center of the country, in Hazarajat. French doctors are currently to be found in a central province, far to the west of Kabul. The provinces of Logar, Wardak, Ghazni, Parwan and Badakhshan are in the midst of struggle. Others, such as Hazarajat and Nuristan, because of their mountainous nature, are not occupied. Finally, the cities are active--first of all Herat, Jalalabad and now Kabul, the center of the uncertain Parcham regime.

For the USSR, the situation is more complicated than it seemed several months ago. The Marxist regime has been preserved, but on the other hand, it has not been strengthened by the Soviet occupation. The offensive capacity of the resistance has not been broken, not because it has adequate weaponry but because the internal resistance has the greatest weapon of any army, classic or otherwise—morale.

Since the middle of the 1950's, the USSR has been Afghanistan's main supplier of industrial products and military equipment—\$2.5 billion until 1973 and \$1 billion between 1973 and 1978. Now Afghanistan is costing the Soviets still more.

If the USSR wants to resolve the problem of Afghan resistance, it must have time, troops and money. It is, of the three, the economic cost which is the Soviet weak point. The greater the Soviet losses in materiel, the heavier the cost will be. For this to happen the resistance fighters need only be equipped with individual antitank weapons of the LAWS 66 (British) or RPG 2 and RPG 7 (Soviet) types.

How to Save Face?

The weakness of the Afghan resistance is at the present time rather similar to that of the United States—a lack of leadership. It must promote the development of new, modern cadres, capable of organizing and coordinating, while establishing parallel hierarchies of a state nature. These higher cadres, obtained from the internal resistance, are indispensable to the resistance. Because of the Afghan historical heritage,

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the resistance is too traditional a reaction, instead of being a demand for economic, social and political change in response to the hindrances to the Afghan society. It still represents the other side of the brutal and mechanical modernism of the regime to too great an extent. But the war is playing a modernizing role. Younger cadres will doubtless emerge. More precise demands will take shape in the interior. Meanwhile, the important thing is that the resistance receive the means to defend itself effectively.

It is not accurate to say, on the other hand, that the Soviets have not committed genocide in Afghanistan. This is war, with its concomitant demands and victims. The number of refugees in Pakistan exceeds 800,000. Nor, to my knowledge, is there any evidence with regard to the use of napalm either. The Soviets are there to strengthen a regime, not to decimate the population.

There is little likelihood that the Soviets will withdraw. What purpose would intervention have served if they did? Moreover, how could they save face? Basically, the policy of force pursued by the USSR is based on the acceptance, on the part of the victim, of the concept that this force is invincible. Without a doubt the new Afghan war will be a prolonged one, the outcome of which does not depend on the Afghans alone. But it is the Afghans alone who took up the challenge immediately, at the most difficult moment.

Those who believe that it is possible to return to the previous status quo, that is to say Afghan neutrality by diplomatic means, are without question nurturing illusions. For the USSR, Afghanistan is henceforth an integral part of the Soviet camp, even if Moscow says the contrary to pacify a West which needs only to be reassured.

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ALGERIA

BEN BELLA'S'SERIOUS ERRORS' EXAMINED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 16 Jul 80 pp 30-31

[Article by Kouider Sami Nair, professor of political science: "Two Serious Errors of Ben Bella"]

[Text] The profession of faith of [former president] Ahmed Ben Bella that we published (see JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1014) has generated as anticipated—and hoped fordiscussion among our readers. We give today the opinion of Kouider Sami Nair, an Algerian, 34 years old, professor at Paris VIII university, while next week we shall publish the opinion of Mohammed Harbi, a historian and former adviser of Ahmed Ben Bella.

That a voice that had been stifled for a long time should suddenly burst on us to challenge us in the very area where we are hesitant is perhaps more than a sign: It is an annunciation. That this voice should be that of the first president of independent Algeria gives this annunciation its dramatic and simultaneously symbolic character. Here is a man who has returned to the present after an attempt was made to plunge him into oblivion, openly proclaiming what springs into the minds of the masses seeking to find themselves. Could it be that Ahmed Ben Bella has known, better and more passionately than others, how to listen to what has been taking shape for a decade now in the heart of the Moslem community? And what annunciation, what prophesy is heralded by the exile of M'Sila?

Extent of the Ill

There is first the failure of the West, at least in the eyes of non-Westerners. There is the failure of a model of economic organization based on the exploitation of man but also on the subjugation of entire peoples. There is the failure of a system whose substance, because it resides in the insatiable growth of profit, ends up destroying even the simple and basic humanity in man-so that man has become a commodity, that his spirituality has experienced such profound transformations that this spirituality continues to be as if paralyzed by all this. Since the beginning of this century these truths have generally been recognized. But the crisis of the models

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and values which flow from this failure is general. It takes along in its wake entire continents including the Third World, which is a continent of continents, and within it the Arab-Moslem world whose pain Ahmed Ben Bella strives to embody.

## Distinctive and Excessive

And yet, not to distinguish the reasons which have made such a dynamic effect possible would be to commit a serious error. To call the West something exclusive is one thing; to say as Ben Belia is doing that imperialism resides "in us" is even better. But please, enough generalizations and let us be more specific. Who is this "we"? That the crisis of imperialism should be stressed today by the crisis of the Arab-Moslem world evidences a third and more fundamental failure--that of the Arab national movement. Wherever the petty bourgeoisie, the old middle classes, and the army of "revolutionaries" and bureaucrats who have led this movement have assumed power in the past 30 years, the political situation is manifest. The national Arab-Moslem movement has been able to initiate political liberation but is has been unable to secure economic independence.

The reason for this is known: In the face of these millions of under-privileged people mobilized to overcome colonialism and imperialism, these classes and social groups have not wanted to run the risk of a historic face to face in which they would have lost everything. Rather, once recognition of their sovereignty was secured, they strived to become allied with their former enemy and to act as his surrogate in the interest of their security. This "we" mentioned by Ahmed Ben Bella thus has something distinctive and excessive about it--distinctive to the extent that he designates a historic-social reality (the Arab-Moslem national movement) to which Ben Bella belonged and which he has been unable to leave behind, excessive because, instead of attacking the narrowness and ideological and political limits of this movement, Ben Bella is satisfied with criticisms, justified incidentally, of the West.

# Terrible Apocalypses

This uncritical attitude regarding the social and ideological content of nationalism had led Ben Bella to commit two serious and dangerous errors. One is a theoretical error and the other a political error. Ben Bella is right to attack bourgeois rationalism, cold and calculating, whose purpose is to assure control over nature through the domination of man over man. Ben Bella is right to challenge a technology obeying especially the laws of profit-making and containing in the form of atomic arms more terrible apocalypses. But Ben Vella dommits a serious error as soon as he identified "rational philosophy" and finally rationalism itself with this bourgeois rationalism. Hence the consequence that he does not fail to produce and which consists in calling by way of counterpoint on the irrationality of religious sentiment.

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### Incoherence

Now, to oppose the irrationality of feeling to instrumental rationality is again to be a prisoner of a bourgeouis problem of rationality. Let one merely recall the experience of the movements and regimes which, in this 20th century, have not hesitated to use the capital of irrationality which mutilates the masses unconsciously and let one consider the consequences that it entails. Without abusively imputing such an idea on Ben Bella, is it not through the extraordinary manipulation of irrationality that the Nazi and Fascist movements managed to impose themselves? It is thus appropriate to think about the practical scope of rationality and irrationality in society.

One will understand, for example, that the national movement, with forms of bourgeois and petty bourgeois thought, could not propose anything besides a grotesque and depreciated caricature of Western bourgeois rationality. There was no question, once independence was secured, of creating a new rationality, of stimulating society intellectually, of modestly gauging real possibilities. Rather, from a demagogic viewpoint it was necessary to see things very big, to ape the capitalist West, to "borrow" its money and techniques—in short, to destroy what had not been destroyed yet and to alter profoundly the future of underdeveloped societies. Responsibility, here, is measured in social terms, in terms of the class struggle and not as a function of "rational philosophy."

And this applies to technology as well as to rationality and science. That this imported technology should hurt in lasting fashion societies which are not prepared to assume it, that it should additionally be ineffective and economically disastrous is also obvious. But in that respect, too, it is important to be specific.

Now, it is necessary to find that the peoples of the Third World are excluded from a nexus with technology. In that respect, too, ape-like technocrats act as surrogates for the technological aggression against the Third World. It is thus not rationality in itself, technology, "Western" science--notions that it is always necessary to consider as relative--which are to be condemned but rather the bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, and technocracy of the developing countries. And it is because he does not see these realities clearly that Ben Bella is committing his second error, this one a political error.

That it should be necessary to oppose self-management and the multparty system to tentacular bureaucracy and technocracy is the most obvious and the most radical of the alternatives. For self management has the virtue, among other things, of challenging every form of power over society. It transforms the social individual into an adult and responsible being. It gives him the possibility of managing his life. Similarly, multipartyism carries in itself, beyond the cultural anrichment resulting from the democratic exchange of ideas, a cardinal virtue: Social tolerance as a model of behavior.

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Accordingly, it is necessary to have a minimum of coherence: One cannot proclaim the necessary autonomy of the individual vis-via power, tolerance wervus partisan totalitarianism, and at the same time make the apology of religion as a lever of struggle even if one takes numerous verbal precautions regarding the alleged respect for "minorities."

### Where Is Tolerance?

For in its essence religion relics on an undemonstrated truth which, precisely for that reason, threatens to become transformed into fanaticism and dangerous dogmatism. Until proof to the contrary is forthcoming one has not seen in Iran, for example, a country which serves as example to Ben Bella, the liberation of women or the social emancipation of workers. Are workers on strike not charged every day by Ayatollah Khomeyni with playing the stooges of "communist atheism"? Where is the tolerance? Where is the freedom in a society where half of the population is obliged to wear chadors [women's veils]? And it is indeed at that point that it is necessary to consider those "Islamic" or Arab-Islamic values mentioned so frequently by Ben Bella. What is their content? Is it a return to the caliphate, a historic situation about which little is known in the final analysis? And is this return possible now that the planet has been profoundly marked by Western capitalism, now that the development of productive forces, the organization of the world economy and technology raise massive and unavoidable problems? And in more radical fashion, why could these values not prevent the destruction of traditional social relationships by triumphant capitalism? Would it not be because, in the last analysis, they are in no way incompatible with this capitalism? Would it be happenstance if 'Moslem' capital exists today--according to Ben Bella's own expression? To raise these questions is to assume responsibilities before history.

## Minor Adventure

What is needed is the courage to swim against the current, not to become swallowed up in any old movement under the pretext that it calls imperialism into question once again. Those masses which seek each other and which pray today in the Moslem-Arab world, what else do they seek if not their own social liberation? Ahmed Ben Bella is undoubtedly a man of ideas but--and this is certain--he is first and foremost a man of action. Let him be able to distinguish--and no one expects less of him-between the path of human emancipation, of cultural liberation, and that of the minor adventure which does no more than postpone the true deadlines.

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IRAN

### NATIONAL LIBERATION LITERATURE FROM IRANIAN AZERBAIJAN

Baku AZERBAYJAN in Azerbaijani No 1, 1980 pp 35-45

[Article by Mirza Ibrahimov in the monthly literary-esthetic journal of the Azerbaijani Writers' Union: "Revival in the South"]

The enemy sees us giving up hand in hand,
We give up our feebleness to the enemy.
They want to destroy the building blocks of every revolution,
But they must get the permission of our architecture.
Be rational and you will conquer the enemy
Our enemies fear that rationality
Create unity! The voice is unanimous among our people—
We will eliminate our poverty from our existence.
Sheriyar, "The Bird of Freedom" (VARLYQ)

[Text] Everyone remembers major historical events like the revolution which overthrew the monarchy of the shah in Iran in 1979.

The revolution brought to all Iran, especially Iranian Azerbaijan, a new life in culture, literature and the arts. Now, in Tehran, Tabriz, Ardabil and other cities a number of new journals and newspapers have begun to appear. Although these journals and newspapers emanate from different sources, they all have a similar tone: They publish fact-finding articles, exposes, short stories and poetry about past reigns of the shahs, concentrating on the tyranny and injustice, treason and venality of the Pahlevi regime. Naturally, these articles are full of rage and antipathy toward Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, the last evil symbol of this dynasty. At the same time, they anathematize the imperialist aghas [lords] who created and nourished the Pahlevi tyranny, forced them to eat and drink it, and encouraged even more bloody and ugly actions. In the first issue of the journal VARLYQ we read in the article "National Oppression in Azerbaijan" by M. E. Yashar: "From the historical point of view, the fearful tyrannical regime which continued in Iran for more than a century was established by world imperialism after World War I as a strategic maneuver, basically under the aegis of English imperialism." Based on this strategy, the foundation of a "powerful and centralized"

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state in Iran, as in a number of other countries, was able to insure two fundamental goals of imperialism. One of these post-World War I goals was to give warning to Iran about the course of the revolution underway in Russia, its northern neighbor; the second was to make Iran's economic situation dependent on Western imperialism, to plunder its natural resources and to turn its commercial possibilities into a marketplace of imperialism." (VARLYQ No 1, 1979 p 12)

The author notes that in setting up this anti-national and anti-democratic plan, "the militarist government of Iran headed by Reza Khan and, later, his son, held the future in their hands." All the "national and democratic possibilities" which had been won by the constitutional revolution were destroyed. By "destroying all free and independent channels" they created "the basis of a despotic regime." Similarly, they eliminated "all social and political freedoms." "By crushing the revolutionary spirit of the people under their heels," they tried to "remove freedom of speech and thought from everyone." They turned "Iran into a prison of peoples."

The author of the article writes later that the elimination of the national entities, cultures and languages of the peoples living in Iran was based on injuries inflicted on the peoples by the "feudal-bourgeois chauvinism" policy of the Pahlevi state. "In these terrible and severe years of turbulence the people of Azerbaijan, like other peoples in Iran, were forbidden an existence wherein they could use their mother tongue, regional characteristics, national awareness and culture. Their activities and skills were crushed and liquidated because they could not follow a healthy evolutionary path and their very best human characteristics were ridiculed."

It is natural: the Azerbaijanis, like all peoples living in Iran, when seeing the light of a revolutionary dawn, after the dark night of 50 years of tyranny, have taken the first joyful steps on the road of educational, cultural, spiritual and social uplift. Long-suppressed aspirations of the people have begun to flourish, and these find their reflection, above all, in belles-lettres.

The poem entitled "The Voice of Time" by Shehriyar in the first issue of VARLYQ is written with high craftsmanship. The poem finds its way into the reader's heart with its depth of feeling and ideas, and compels him to think:

I slept in my hammock as in my childhood, The voice of my mother lullables me; If I am on a journey, the jingling of the camel-bells Awakens me, the voice of a passing caravan.

Recently the throne trembled, listen
To the voice of the nations cry for help and mercy
That greasy voice cannot remain my prison for forty years
If it is not greasy, then accept from me my humble voice.

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If I raise my voice, I must express the evil —
The nation is bitter, a powerful voice is raised...
If the voice is magnetic, in armed revolt, pay attention,
If is the brave voice of the commanders of freedom.

(VARLYQ No 1, 1979 p 32)

The joyful situation that strikes the eye in contemporary southern literature is the proliferation of essays, journalism criticism and scientific articles. In these writings the historical past, the music, the language and literature of the people are discussed, and works of contemporary writers are analyzed. Genjeli Sabahi, in an article devoted to the great patriotic poet Sehend, who recently died, evaluates the work of the poet very highly and acquaints us enthusiastically about a number of his esthetic and idealistic qualities. He notes especially Sehend's loathing of tyranny, his patriotism, and his love for progressive social ideals. "The world of the poet exists for itself. He wants freedom. A life where everyone is free. Where compassion and peace reign. The poet does not search for a pleasant, free life for himself alone:

I am not alone;
The pulse of my people, my territories,
Beats with me.
My heart is beating, but
In my breast there is no heart,
But a million hearts are beating.
Like the butterfly I was struck
By the torch called life in the world.
If I burn, I do not weep;
I was born to burn
In this melancholy state
Without hesitation.

(Op. cit., p 39)

During the period of tyranny Sehend did a lot of courageous educational and patriotic work, wrote and published beautiful works in his native language, helped other writers and aroused great love among the people for the fine arts. As a result, enthusiastic works about Sehend are published, and poetry is dedicated to him. The value of these works is that they celebrate the ideals of the liberation and happiness of the people as the meaning of the whole existence and creativity of Sehend. For example, the poet Muzeffer in his poem "In Praise of Sehend":

You did not bow your head; you revolted against the tyranny and reaction oppressing the fatherland. Never being silent, you called for justice in every way at every period...

(Op. cit., p 48)

As for the poet Eli Tebrizi, he wrote an excellent poem in the classical ghazal form in which he sketches the qualities he esteems valuable in the life, creativity and activity of Sehend in his memoir:

As a youth Sehend saw his language enslaved.
Believe us, he almost died guarding his honor.
As days passed in tyranny, he yearned for the sun.
When the sun rose and set, he wept for us.
When the bitter winter frosts melted,
Though it was spring, it was fall for us.
Look at the present unity, know this profound secret
That everything that was has perished, and only this
limb remains to us.
Tebrizi's wish is nothing else:
If there is unity, no pogrom shall fall to us.

(Op. cit., p 49)

One of the factors showing the life and strength of the literature of Iranian Azerbaijan is that, despite the disastrous severe persecutions, poetry, short stories reflecting the feelings of discontent, loathing and anger of the people in the period of despotism in the mother tongue, and many folklore samples were collected. Certainly, at that time, the majority of these works never saw the light; as for some others, they were withdrawn from the printer and destroyed. Now some recently printed works which have come to hand are supplied to the readers. It is natural that some of them contain a deep grief engendered by the period. For example, we read in the poem by Dr Hamid Nitgi:

Do not look at the yellow mountains,
May your eyes not fix on any distance at all;
Do not speak: whatever happens, let your ears become deaf,
Consciences are rusty, sleep difficult...
The dark night is a pit without bottom,
Tears in the breast and secret fear...
Sword strapped in its scabbard so it doesn't cut,
The grip of the murderer is on your throat.
If you cast off the chains which have been on your
neck for years
You are exiled within the homeland, if you live as
a stranger...

Although there is a sorrow in these poems which reflects the tragic influence of tyranny, oppression and injustice on the human personality, there is neither pessimism nor lack of hope; the hope of a dawn of freedom lives.

In a poem called "There Is a Road Going Toward the Dawn" there are many lines calling for unity and struggle:

Go, your home is distant, but close;
Grit your teeth, do not push, be calm;
Hope from no one a remedy for your grief:
We are no one,— you and me
If we die, or if we stay, its just a road.
Give me your hand, perhaps we'll limp to a stopping-place;
If I should fall, continue along the road, fellow traveler;
Do not resist but move on, cross these mountains—
Your knees are strong, do not tire, move on...

Dr Hamid Nitgi (VARLYQ No 1, 1979)

If we take into consideration what the poet wrote at the beginning of the 1970's, that is, when Mohammed Reza Shah inflicted a limitless government on the people, began to set up hotels, properties and estates in foreign accounts based on the millions of dollars flowing in from Iranian oil, filled the country with American "advisers" and weapons, strengthened the secret police organization, and put freedom-loving and patriotic sons of the people on trial, we are able to get an idea of the intense feelings under which the poet lived and created. We meet these kinds of feelings in the works of other poets and writers which show how deep the pains stimulated by the shah's tyranny is in the bosom of the people. A poem written by Hebib Sahir in the time of tyranny, but published only now, describes the painful, sorrowful situation of that time:

A lot of autumns

came and went.

A lot of caravans

stopped and moved on.

In one autumn we were orphaned,

in one autumn, we were inflamed!

Finally,

in the realm of our dreams,

we took wing...

Time came,

time went,

We thought,

each alone,

of our homeland.

We longed for

the cool springs...
the verdant fields.

(VARLYQ No 2, 1979 pp 42-43)

As for the charming sympathetic ghazals of the poet Valeh, he wrote an interesting ghazal in 1978, a time of great recklessness of Mohammad Reza Shah when he considered himself the "leader of the people" and "lord," and the terror against the discontented masses was intensified. Here the powerful patriotic feelings are expressed with great poetic beauty and similes:

ĭ. I.

The heart endured this evil pain of the difficult years, but burned.

I cannot express the grief with which the heart was inflamed.

The grief of my country is mine, -- I am a poet of this land!

The wasting of the land was done by grievous tyranny, o heart!

O fairy of freedom! Awaken, open your eyes,

The heart awaits your arrival with bewildered astonishment
Thousands of youths are being sacrificed to you every day.

Come mercifully, sit not silently that the heart be annihilated.

I have opened this naked soul to you, I give it as a gift.

If it is my fate, the heart will become another sacrifice on this road;

My children will mourn for the homeland.

The heart sustains these tragic griefs.

(VARLYQ No 3/4, 1979 p 65)

In scientific, literary and publicist articles and writings, even in letters from readers, there is a many-sided discussion of the vile acts of the time of absolutism and the tortures inflicted on the working masses and different peoples. It is seen from the opinions and styles of expression that the authors of these essays and letters represent different strata of the society. From this point of view a letter by a reader named Seyid Ebdulhemid Surkhabi is of interest. He considers "reading and writing in one's own language, lectures in one's own language in all schools, the use of the mother tongue in the organs of justice, the courts, on radio and television, and the publication of newspapers and magazines in one's own language" to be a natural right.

Later, returning to the time of the shah, he notes that "it was a demand of the nature of that regime not to open the way for such things at this time. Such tyranny in an Islamic republic and the possibility of disobeying the laws and decrees of Allah are inconceivable. Otherwise, an Islamic republic would have denied its nature and philosophical substance." (VARLYQ No 2, 1979 p 49)

As is seen, Seyid Ebdulhemid is a religious man. He bases the right of every people to communicate in its own language and to read, write and publish books on verses in the Koran, and calls those opposed to this "a movement of those who do not give in to us because we are Azerbaijanis, and a movement of those who wish to tie us by force to their languages and cultures; a satanic rebellion against the will of Allah." (Ibid., p 5)

In the majority of articles published in Iran and Iranian Azerbaijan, publishing books in the people's own language is tied to the question of the opening of schools. This is one of the most injurious aspects of the "accursed generation who gave us the old time of tyranny." In the journals whose names we have mentioned above, articles are published on questions of learning the past history of a people and its language on a scientific

basis. Since the mother tongue was persecuted for a long time, and since the road was not open for instruction in the native tongue even in farms and elementary schools, there are a number of questions on the development of a language on which no research has been done, the literary language has not been purged of Arabic and Persian elements, and the correspondences between the popular vernacular and the literary language have not been studied. Intellectuals, writers and scientists are now dwelling on these types of problems. From this point of view the articles by M. E. Yashar "The Spoken Language Is the Written Language" and H. N. Altay's "Rich Poverty" are interesting. Yashar shows the mistake of "those who consider a literary language to be the language of the city, area or locality where they live" and calls on writers, poets and litterateurs "to cooperate in a collective and unique literary and written language for all the people." (VARLYQ No 2, 1979 pp 3-4)

As for Altay, in his article "Rich Poverty" he connects the question of the development of the language history of Azerbaijan with an all-sided and deep learning of the lexicon and rules of grammar, and writes about the persecution of the language by reactionary and ruler-worshipping men left over from the time of tyranny, and the defense of the language from attack: "No one has the right or authority to prohibit or forbid our spoken language. Our language shall be heard everywhere, unconditionally and without reservation, in the home, in the street, in the medreses, in firms, and in every conceivable official and unofficial place and office." (VARLYQ No 3/4, 1979 p 6)

The author notes that in order to learn the language, to show its richness and power, and to define its grammar and laws on a scientific basis "we will even translate works by authoritative scholars and methodologists from Soviet Azerbaijan as well as the works of other philologists belonging to other countries and ideologies. This time, you will be unable to suppress us under the pretext of 'communism' or 'pan-Turkism' for the 'sin' to connect our past with speaking or writing our own language." (Ibid., p 7)

The majority of the writings which have appeared in the journals recently in Iranian Azerbaijan and have passed through our hands are of a democratic spirit and attract attention through their broadness of subject matter. In these articles the benefit of workers and tillers of the soil, and the idea of friendship among the peoples of Iran are defended. For example, at the meeting which took place at the founding of the "Azerbaijan Writers' and Poets' Union" we read in the list of objectives of the group: "to disseminate among the people the idea of a working and toiling class who are drawn to planning ahead and to defend this idea, to declare unity with all other suffering peoples of Iran, and to shun ideologies advocating every kind of accursed nationalistic or religious remedy." (YOLDASH No 8, 1979 p 30)

YOLDASH and VARLYQ especially noted May Day, the day of international solidarity of the workers. On this subject a large number of publicistic articles and poetry were published. The poem called "Workman's Holiday" by Muzaffer is on this subject.

The worker's holiday is the 1st of May,
The anniversary of the Chicago event,
93 years ago, rising up,
Putting their lives on the line
To emerge from tyranny and slavery,
Seeing through the insults and the bribes
They gathered one day and revolted;
A revolt against injustice, tyranny, and the masters.

What is interesting there is that the poet, in describing an historical event, in other words, the celebration of the workers of Chicago, uses such words and expressions that they remind the reader of the days of the shah's tyranny:

From this side police, agents, gendarmes—
The lowly, the hooligans, a years worth of traitors—
Rifles, picks, clubs in their hands
And bullets, bombs, gunpowder, knives and hammers
They attacked the working class,
The opposition to the bourgeoisie, the overlords.
Calling them "troublemakers," "traitors"—
They turned the demonstration into blood.

(VARLYQ No 1, 1979 p 62)

The poets and writers of Iranian Azerbaijan, while reflecting the complex life, desires and aspirations, and the truth about the unending social struggles, quickly turned to the brave history of the fatherland and its revolutionary past, and they try to push the movement forward by means of historical parallels. In their works Babek, Dede Gorgud, Koroghlu and Gachag Nebi are recalled, and the constitutional revolution and the Azerbaijan democratic movement of 1941-1945 are commemorated proudly. In the poem by Eziz Mohsun "Settarkhan" the brave struggle by the great revolutionary and his unforgettable services to the people are eulogized:

Brave son of our heroic people,
Our people praise you this day.
You stood up against injustice and tyranny.
Every celebration was opened by your hand.
A pity! The dark curtain of tyranny
Again tightens its grip on the throat of our people.
The order of the crown-bearing executioner
Crushes thousands into the good earth.
Once again blood gushes from the mouth of tyranny,
Justice-loving men are imprisoned.
Again bloodied hands strike
This beloved earth, this Azerbaijan.

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This poem was written in the years when reaction and despotism flooded the land. The serious condition of the country is described with a sorrowful heart. Eziz Mohsun, like the poets from whose works we have cited examples, despite the tragic and severe condition of the country, do not lose the hope of freedom and say that the people will not submit to any executioner, that they will struggle resolutely, and that the day of liberation is sure to come.

But this country will not submit

If it goes on a thousand more terrible days.

It will rage like a wave-torn sea;
Although the wind is rising, my star will shine...

Settarkhan! May it be sworn on your name,
May it be sworn not to submit to that banner,

May it be sworn that illegitimate blood shall be cast off,
May it be sworn inextinguishably to brave men

That we shall finish this sacred struggle.
Our hearts are beating with the love of freedom.

Even if a river of blood should flow on this road,
These lands shall not yield to tyranny...

(VARLYQ No 1, 1979 pp 52-53)

It is of value that in the pages of the press emerging in the south not only literature from the classical period, but also from the 19th and 20th centuries are treated as a unity. Examples from the works of poets, writers and scholars who wrote and write now in both parts of Azerbaijan are presented. In articles like "Settarkhan in the Poetry of Sabir," "Ustad Shehriyar and Gachag Nebi" we see the poems of Sabir and examples from Nebi's popular epic poem. Similarly, we read the poem of Shehriyar "Gachag Nebi":

There is a key to the door of the prison, Nebi. We are harnessing a plane to the birds, Nebi, You cannot stay in this hot prison. You could not sell the mother's cradle. You could not strike the homeland of the fathers. O, victim of honor, brave Nebi.

(VARLYQ No 3/4, 1979 p 42)

In the articles by Hesen Mejidzade Savala "Hajy Mirza Rushdiyye" and Sehend's "He Died by Semed Sebahi" we come across valuable information and exciting ideas about the writer-teacher Rushdiyye and theatrical director Semed Sebahi which demonstrates the unforgettable services to popular education and theatrical arts in the 19th and 20th centuries through their literary and stage activities.

After the turbulence of life in Iran today, after the unceasing shakingup of social relations and violent conflicts between different fronts, movements and classes, and after confusion in a number of regions, finally

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both the open and secret hostile activity by the shah (who is now in America) and his aghas (lords) and nobles find their reflection in various ways in the works of Iranian Azerbaijani writers. Especially the national question which Prime Minister Bazargan calls "conflicts between Sunni and Shiite, Arab and Persian, Turk and Kurd" and considers "a nasty stain on history" (AZERBAYJAN, 1979 (2690) 128)--is a question about which all peoples, all intellectuals -- in a word, the writers of Azerbaijan--must think. Forward-thinking intellectuals, writers, progressive people, above all, the masses wish to live under conditions of friendship, equality, good relations and connections not only with the people of Iran but with the peoples of the entire world. Reactionaries under the ruling terror, a shah with neither crown nor throne, plundering imperialists and ruling chauvinist circles are trying to reach their hypocritical objectives among the people by inspiring hostilities among the Azerbaijanis and Kurds, who have been neighbors for centuries, and which have divided fire and hearth, salt and bread, by putting them into conflict with each other.

Progressive forces and true patriots of Iran understand this tactic of the enemy and must try to know of their seditious activities beforehand, and must create an atmosphere of friendship and security among the peoples of the region. But attaining this great goal by the use of weapons or force or, as the new Tudeh Party has said "by untying a knot with your teeth when your fingers will do." However, there is but one path: The Tudeh Party of Iran is of the opinion that it is possible to create "tranquility" by a bending and twisting road. But, neither in Kurdistan nor in other areas where national deprivation exists is a solution to the national question possible." (AZERBAYJAN, 1979 (2690) 128)

It is a joyous state that southern writers and intellectuals divulge the hypocritical ideas of the enemy in their activities and works, and activate intelligent and influential courses of action against them. VARLYQ reports that the Azerbaijan Committee reported a meeting of Azerbaijanis living in Tehran with Seyid Ezeleddin Huseyin, the spiritual leader of the great Kurdish people. At this meeting "in a few words by the committee the long historical friendship and brotherhood between the Kurdish and Azerbaijani people was noted and the desire was expressed to strengthen this friendship and brotherhood even more from day to day." (VARLYQ No 2, 1979 p 61)

Events occurring in the south show that, as the writer Eli Tebrizi wrote in his article "What Is Being" the period of "burning silently in the flames of bitter national oppression is to be roasted silently" is over. They are determined to defend and preserve resolutely the material and spiritual blessings which the people won through obstinacy and for which they made so many sacrifices and destroyed the tyranny. On this we read in the journal: "We will not give up this freedom which came into our hands at the cost of thousands of our compatriots and youths at any price. This time, let us protect our freedom like our very lives. If freedom goes, so must our life go." (VARLYQ No 2, 1979 p 55)

Now, everywhere in the world working men and peoples are demanding their natural rights and laws. Especially on the road to this great objective diverse social classes and peoples are unifying their powers; they are striving to attain solidarity and to struggle in unity. Because strength and victory are now in unity! And not a dissenting voice! The poem by Vulka "In Unity There Is Strength" was not written without reason; it is a requirement of life, development and victory.

This word comes down from our fathers: Unity of all is an army of strength. Unity gives strength to the country, Unity creates every hope...

(Op. cit., p 66)

The works of Iranian Azerbaijani poets and writers also compel attention due to their esthetic qualities. The beautiful language, the meaningful similes, the smooth, agile vernacular expressions, the tendency to generalize philosophically, and its base in general human conceptions of patriotic feelings are valuable characteristics of this literature. It drinks from the sources of the rich classical literary heritage to a significant degree and from the creativity of the people. One meets the poetry and names of Semed Vurghun, Suleyman Rustem, Resul Rza, Eliagha Vahid, Bekhtiyar Vahabzade, Eliagha Kurchayly and others in newspapers and journals in the south. "Glorious Truth" by Muzeffer, "My Ancient Homeland" by Eli Tebrizli, Sahirli's "Song of the Homeland," H. Choshghun's "My Tabriz" and a number of other poets of this type express the truth about the revolution, freedom, and the rights of free men. In "Glorious Truth" we read:

If there is no glorious truth in the world—
Nature's imprint, the world of poetry, is inevitably corrupted.
The wild darkness of bitter tyranny spreads everywhere;
Tyranny, suffering, agony and torture grip the world;
No one finds felicity in this world;
All mankind is blanketed with fear and ferocity.

The poets, who connect the ideal of freedom with the victory of truth, finally, state that lies are to be wiped off the face of the earth, that humanity shall be liberated from terror and tyranny, and that they shall be united in illumination, freedom and felicity.

The day will come when mankind shall be free—
Speaking and writing will be free, the conscience will be joyous.
Manifest official injustice will not exist;
A powerful compelling force grips the world.
Intellectuals say that this force is the strength of the country:
It is the force raging against injustice and inequity;
The wind is the force of the sighs of the oppressed,
The criminal does not know of our solidarity beforehand.

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Look, see how my land is ready for this opportunity, Darkness grows steadily on these horizons:

My people have a firm resolve—
Glorious truth must flare up soon.

(VARLYQ No 2, 1979 p 65)

Basic truth is the free and felicitous ideal of peoples and working men. Tyranny, exploitation, violence and oppression are the enemies of truth. They embody lies, terror, two-facedness and hypocrisy. In that place where people are free, the truth shall flare up, every place shall be illumined with its light, and the hearths shall see it. In the poem by Eli Tebrizli "My Ancient Homeland" he stated that the people of Iran, in a word, the Azerbaijanis who raised the banner of revolution, lived with this hope. Here, connected with aspirations for a free, felicitous, bright day of this ancient people who inherited bravery, courage, fortitude and fearlessness from their ancestors, says:

The dawn is upon us, awaken forever my country. May my country always exist with justice in this world. Your brave being is a complex structure, May you go on forever, my hearth and country.

The poet calls on the people to cast off the sorrows and agonies of the regime of tyranny, to live in joy and gaiety, and to look hopefully to the future in their movement and activity:

The face of national existence, which has seized the day, flares up.

May your face be as brilliant as the sun, my country.

If the light is extinguished in our undying homeland,

My country must light a torch from its immortal soul.

(Op. cit., p 53)

It is known that the shah's regime gave no thought to the economic and cultural development of Iranian Azerbaijan. They left no means for the prosperity of the villages, cities and farms, for the opening of factories and industries on a modern industrial and technical basis, for equipping the agricultural enterprises with machinery. For this reason, unemployment in the towns and farms of Iranian Azerbaijan grew from day to day. Hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis went south in the hope of finding work. The poet, specifically viewing this situation, says:

Come, do not leave the fatherland,

Do not attach yourself to a stranger, brother!
That is not the way of the times.

A stone does not drown in stone.
Strike like lightning,

Flow like a torrent,

But with the force of stone...

(Op. cit., p 54)

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As is seen, in the literature created in Iranian Azerbaijan, the people's "flashing like lightning, flowing like a torrent, boiling over interment" is a powerful motivation to struggle to move toward a new goal, meaningful activity, and a new life. Certainly these ideas and feelings are conceived in life itself. They are removed from rhetoric, they do not want empty shouting, their eyes have been opened in the revolutionary struggle, their creative powers are the expression of the work and activity of the enraged masses—they come to literature from life and, burning with the flame of inspiration, filled with poetic passions, turn to life anew. Our desire is that this connection of esthetic conception with life be further strengthened in Iranian Azerbaijani literature and, that with new brilliant scenes of the people's work and aspiration which illuminate and beautify this literary life, they will please us with new beautiful examples of their poetic ideas.

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IRAN

EXAMPLES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION LITERATURE

Baku AZERBAYJAN in Azerbaijani No 1, 1980 pp 46-57

[Selections of Works by various Iranian Azerbaijani writers, with comment by Mirza Ibrahimov]

[Text] After the fall of the shah, while the publishing activity in Iranian Azerbaijan was left to different associations, unions and groups, for all of them there is but one goal: To teach the people of Azerbaijan their own national characteristics, both historical and cultural, in their native language.

To give you an idea of the newspapers and magazines being published: DÄDÄ GORGUD [an epic hero, common in Azeri literary references], KOROG.LU [similar to the preceding title], AZÄRBAIJAN, ARAZ [the river serving as boundary between N. and S. Azerbaijan], BIRLIK ["Unity"], KHÄLG SÖZÜ ["The Word of the People"], ANA NÄSHR ["The Mother Press"], and ODLAR YURDU ["Land of Fires": a synonym for Azerbaijan].

The basic goal of the Azerbaijani writers and intellectuals working in all these publications is to "return ro the Azerbaijanis" the Azerbaijani language. To quote from an article "The Imprints of Language and Chauvinism in the Social Struggle" in No 3 of JÄNLIBEL magazine: "In the Pahlevi period the mother tongue, especially the written language, was eliminated. The imposition of the Farsi language locked the gateway of knowledge to our people and created obstacles on the way to attaining even a smattering of scientific knowledge."

[Here the text is broken and there is a blurred photo of the covers of a number of the aforementioned publications]

The writers of Iranian Azerbaijan have given great figures to world literature and, it goes without saying, do not repudiate the Farsi language, they do not speak against it. To quote an article "Iran Is Our Country, Azerbaijan Is Our Fatherland" in YOLDASH No 1: "We respect the rights of national unities, but we reject Farsi chauvinism. We will use Farsi as a connecting language in the peoples' struggle at the present time."

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We often find poets like Shähriyar, Häbib Sahir, Sähänd, Süleyman Salis, Hüseyn Düzgün, Hashym Tärlan, Sämäd Bährängi, Alirza Okhtay, Bahruz Dehgani, Sary Ashyg, Chayoghlu, Ülkär, Urmuoghlu, Färrukh Sadyg, Ä. Yähyävi and others, as well as samples from our classical literature and Soviet Azerbaijani poets in the diverse press organs in Iranian Azerbaijan today.

A number of publicistic articles published in the language of the people confirm the awakening of a social consciousness in Iranian Azerbaijan and the revival of an esthetic, literary concept.

Now, we present some of these materials to our readers:

Suleyman Salis, "Mountains"

Your springs flow without number, Peoples stare at them insatiably. The love is there, does not leave me Even when I must be far from you, O mountains.

At the bottom of your green meadow The bee dances in its hive. On the fife of your shepherds There is a story, great mountains.

The partridge flies from your cliffs; The gazelle escapes into your bosom. Spring opens the heart, And our flowered mountains of roses.

Taking on the pain of the sorrowing ones, Faithful to your word.
You, who were the obstacle to the Babeks, I sacrifice myself for you, O mountains.

Salis comes to you as a guest,
May you put on green\* as your garment.
Flowing from your breast to the underground stream,
My eyes have been closed for a long time, 0 mountains.

\*Green is the color of the Islamic banner.

\_\_\_\_\_''A Capricious Dawn''

Come, my love, do not interfere with me this much Because others see it and assume I am wretched.

To bear the anxiety of dark winter, my body shriveled up, You deprived me always of the world of flowers.

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No matter how much tyranny silences the nightingale, O, nightingale of my people, do not hold me to the stone.

I love your pure raiment with all my heart, my fatherland, Since in a world creating my likenesses this is the goal.

A capricious dawn will create the heart of night; The enthusiasm of the day struck me with anxiety.

Victory will cure the sorrow of my people, No one can make that day black for me.

My phantasy is to join the caravan of felicity Even if they hang me on the road.

"Homage to Shähriyar"

O, nightingale of the people, both our wealth and poverty were plundered.

The fire of bitterness burns hot in my breast.

Sorrow and anxiety were bred in our land.

May traitors not remain in our land.

May Allah not take you from our people.

They, the executioners, cut out our eyes. They plundered our caravans on the road to justice. They deprived brother of brother. The frosty wind does not forsake this country; I see your place above, come back.

The words of Shähriyar are recited by heart in different languages,
The eyes of these lands are completely upon you.
Night and day they wish
That you return to the homeland from a foreign place,
Then you will eliminate sorrow from their hearts.

For whatever reason you were living in a distant place You remained in a narrow cage, like the nightingale. You made a decision from the hearts; In their hearts they cannot stand separation; Come back, we are putting an end to sorrow and misfortune.

Red flowers do not grow in a salted field,
The black stain does not bear purity of conscience,
The Azeri land does not lose its labor.
Wherever you go, eyes follow you
Because their words were in your voice.

Writing and creating is a profession for us; The peoples will always support you. I am Süleyman Salis, my homeland is a garden of orchards; I wrote this invitation in the language of the people, My inspiration, from my Azerbaijan.

"Homage to Süleyman Rüstäm"

The eye of bitterness inflames my heart; May the face of reason always be black; Not the Araz, but another has separated us. It was pointless living, saying 'brother' to each other; Our fate was sorrow and anxiety.

On this side Alämdar, on that side Ordubad; On that side was a festival; on this, cries for help; Thinking of the hunt is the merciless Hunter. You have tasted the taste of freedom; Without permission, we hear its name.

The pain of bitterness tried many;
The autumn wind turns our garden pale;
Each of your words said 'life' to us:
They stimulated brothers and inspired children;
May your information be illuminating from day to day.

The cranes left a note of bitterness; Our peoples preserve the memory. Do not be bored, my brother, spring is on the way: May spring come, and I, and you; May the wall that separates us be pulled down.

My name is Süleyman, my pseudonym Salis; I am not free to read and write; My honor is not preserved when I walk as a stranger in the Fatherland In one arm a weapon, in the other a pen: I shall not sell out the Fatherland to others..

Hashym Tarlan, "I See" (in the language of Muhammad Riza Shah)

Honor gone, and nights I see a confusing dream:
I see Iran above me, sword in hand.
I did not know that Iran was this awake,
Supported by countless cannon and guns.
You say, I resist, and now I flee for help.
I see the notorious throne of my father trembling;
The light of my eyes has escaped; I see an elephantine tea-cup.

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Although my reign is over, I will find somewhere abroad; I have enough money to buy another Iran. I will live comfortably, I will remain here. I see the children of the fatherland, of Hell, weeping; If Iran does not please me, I will see it ruined.

The justice of nations is a sore in their mouth.

Neither seeing nor talking, blood flows knee-deep on the street.

Now the times have changed; they revolted against me.

I see the Iranian nation has been called to arms;

I see Zänjan joining to other provinces.

I see Mashhad, Tabriz, Tehran and Qum;
The people, arm in arm, have joined in the attack.
I was checkmated, perhaps I will go to Rome
Because I see today's situation is chaotic;
I see constant raw hate directed towards me.

Why should I stay my hand from this country's bountiful garden?
Why should I stay my hand from the pil underneath the earth?
Why should I stay my hand from that mountain of grief, the horizon of the Caspian?
A pity! I see a problem in the coming days;
I hear, bitterly, that the hand has moved to my destruction.

I hope I can raise my army again;
Strangling their outcries will be a lot of work.
Woe the day when he drew 'six' to my 'five.'
I see a worldwide deluge in 'ten.'
If there is no pumpkin, no heavenly cucumber, then I see an eggplant.

From my childhood I loved dollars; I tied myself, body and soul, to Carter's mane. I sold the oil gratuitously and profited from it. That's why I take care of it now. I see myself as an involuntary captive of a disloyal nation.

I always beat my breast religiously. As a pilgrim, in my piety, I made myself an Imam. I made moderation difficult for imploring mollahs. I see the pleasures I've endured canceled out.

Like Mämdali I put Iran up for auction, o selling! As for the fatherland, I ruined it with my own hand, o selling! Because it belonged to me, the price was cheap, o selling! Do not hit me, elder brother, there is an abundance of everything! With dollars in my hand, I see America and Germany!

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I saw that Hoveida implicated me in his machinations;
He, like I, crawled away to eat from another side.
I said: O, corrupt person, you are taking generously from me.
He said: By God, do not even think about this secret business;
I'm afraid that, like you, many have enriched themselves at
the expense of others.

He said to the shah: Do not rebuke me as a servant of death; The oil of this land and people is here today and gone

Though I have swallowed all Iran I'm still not satisfied. Possibly, there will never be such an opportunity again. I see everyone covering their heads with a blanket.

I see his lice-ridden Muslim collar, in his hand the Koran--I see Khan Suleyman on every side--I see the sweet fisinjan awakening my appetite.

[Photo picturing, side-by-side, two magazines.

Caption reads: Under the right-hand side of the picture, taken from YOLDASH, is written "Kurdistan"; as for the one with the question-mark, Azerbaijan is written underneath it]

Story by Urmu Oghlu: "The Black Ox," YOLDASH No 11

Somewhere, once upon a time, there was a meadow. A lion and three oxen lived in the meadow. One ox was white, one yellow, and one black. Whenever the lion was hungry he contemplated eating one of them. But he did not know how to go about it.

The reason was that the three oxen were all protecting each other, and the lion was not strong enough to go against all of them. When the lion understood this he realized he had to go at it practically and logically.

One day, after the lion had given it a great deal of thought, it struck him that maybe he could separate these oxen, and then he would be able to eat one. While crossing the meadow he saw the yellow ox and, after approaching him very slowly, said: "I want to say a couple of words to you about your danger."

The yellow ox looked at the lion and said: "Go ahead, lion, I'm listening."

The lion said: "As you well know, I am but one lion and you are three oxen. I am all alone here. In your view, which gives us more space, dividing the territory into two, or three parts?"

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The yellow ox thought a bit and said: "What kind of question is this, lion? It's obvious that if we divide it into two, my territory grows.'

The lion said: "Thank you. You have thought it over well. I want to say that the eyes of the white ox show me that he is satisfied, but it has occurred to the black ox that he should eliminate you. As you well know, if one goes, there is sufficient room for the others. I also wanted to say that, if you approve, I will attract the attention of this white ox, point out this fact to him and, no matter how much it pains me, I will seize him and eat him. Then both you and the black ox will always be content. The other would be gone; he would never be able to live in the same place as us."

After the yellow ox had listened to the lion's words, he thought them over. Then it struck him that they would all be content if the lion seized and ate the white ox.

Then, gleefully, the lion approached the black ox. He greeted him, asked how he was, and the black ox answered: "I'm fine, Lord Lion, thank you... How strange it is that you should be so kind."

The lion said: "I am disturbed by what you said. Firstly, I liked you from the beginning. I've now talked to the yellow ox and to you about my liking you."

The black ox, amazed said: "You are disturbed by what I said?"

The lion said: "Yes. Both of you said the same thing. I came, because of him, to talk to you. Your question is logical; on a number of days I have seen this white ox eating grass as if it was going out of style. I thought to myself that he even wants more than his share. Then I went and said to him that after a couple of days of that kind of eating there won't be a blade of grass left in this pasture. Otherwise it would be a clean and good place..."

Then he added: "...I don't know whether it would be better if you and I die of hunger, or whether we remain instead of the yellow ox--look at what this boring white ox is doing to me!? But now I think I can be of some help to you. If you permit, I will twist the horn of this white ox and inform him of this. Then, no matter how painful it is for me, I will seize him and eat him. Then both you and the yellow ox can rest easily. He will be gone; he never deserved living in the same place as us anyway."

The black ox listened to the lion's words and thought them over. In his imagination he cursed the white ox for being so stupid. Whatever the case, he was not worthy of any respect. Then, in his selfishness, he agreed that the lion should seize and eat the white ox.

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The lion parted from the black ox and rushed to find the white ox. He observed him very carefully when he approached him. When the white ox saw him, he became afraid. He understood that the lion was going to eat him. He glanced from side to side because if he saw the yellow ox or the black ox he could call for help. But he saw that no help was forthcoming. The bovine did not know that the lion had already talked to them.

The lion, comforted by the fact that neither the yellow ox nor the black ox would intervene, showed his teeth, leapt, mounted the white ox and began to tear him to pieces. Thusly, after a few days, the lion had finished all the meat from the white ox.

After another few days, the lion was voraciously hungry. It came to him that he might eat one of the remaining oxen. After reflecting upon the matter, he went and found the black ox. He greeted him, asked how he was, and said: "There was a reason for eliminating the white ox and I thought that the yellow ox understood it. But now I see that he does not understand the reason."

The black ox asked: "What happened, Lord Lion?"

The lion said: "I am so disturbed that I don't know what to say. Yesterday he came up to me. He said shamelessly that if he were alone in the meadow it would be much better. There would always be enough food. But he said that this black ox eats more than the dead white ox. He said he was afraid that he wouldn't have enough to eat."

After the black ox had listened to what the lion said and, being very disturbed, said to himself: "Pig of an ox. I only ate from my own portion. I didn't go near your part." Even among oxen there are those that wear blinkers.

The lion said: "My dear black ox, has anything I said angered you?"

The black ox said: "What can I say, my ears are trembling with anger. Now I would be happy if you would tell that stupid yellow ox to keep his eyes off my food."

The lion, making his farewell, said: "I wanted something like this: if it will make you happy, I will inform him."

Then the lion left the ox, approached the yellow ox, and raised his gleaming eyes to the eyes of the poor yellow ox.

When the yellow ox saw the lion, he read his mind then, becoming alert, his eye scanning the meadow, he saw the black ox standing at some distance. His voice breaking, he called to him for help. But he saw that the black ox was deliberately not listening. The lion showed his teeth, attacked at once, rolled him over and, after gashing him a few times, began to eat him. The black ox, after watching a while, went away to graze.

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A few days went by and the lion felt a ravenous hunger. This time he thought of eating the black ox. But the lion saw that the black ox stayed far away from him these days. After searching the meadow he came upon the black ox. His head was hung downwards as he was searching out the best grass. Then, his eyes caught the lion, and he said: "Hello, lion, now it seems that I'm on your mind. I said to myself, what would happen if the lion wanted me as food? Look, lion, here is some superb food."

The lion looked the black ox over but did not answer him. Then the black ox thought it over in his heart and said to himself: "Allah, be merciful! This time he wants to seize me and eat me."

The black ox said: "What happened, lion, you're not speaking?"

The lion said: "Whatever happens, for how many days can I keep my tongue away from meat? You know very well that there is no cure for my hunger. I won't beat around the bush; I will say frankly that I came here to eat you."

When the black ox heard this, he fell down trembling. He saw that his time was up. In the meadow there was just the lion and himself. Not a single other animal was there to come to his aid. He thought, would that the yellow ox or the white ox were still alive. Had his two comrades still been alive, it would not have occurred to the lion to eat one when it was alone. What a pity it was that he had approved of the others being eaten. Then it occurred to him that there was no longer any point to such regrets. And the lion would eat him. He looked at the lion and said:

"Now, if you want, you may eat me--but first I want to say something."

The lion said: "Talk fast because I'm starving to death."

The black ox said in a loud voice: "When the white ox was eaten, I was eaten!" His voice reverberated through every part of the meadow and the lion, his mouth watering, leapt on the black ox and began to eat him.

I should say that even now you can hear the voice of the black ox from this meadow: "When the white ox was eaten, I was eaten!"

Memoir by Häbib Sahir, "Yearning for fresh bread and halvah," KOLDASH, No 3

In the period of the rule of the Pahlevi dynasty Persian chauvinism trampled on the rights of the people of Azerbaijan. Thusly, teaching in the schools in the Azeri language was banned, the theaters were closed, and not even one newspaper was published in the Azeri language.

Our school director, in order to prove his subservience to the lords, had organized spies who, when they heard the children speaking Türki [i.e.,

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Azerbaijani], had to punish them. Because of this, not one word of Azeri emerged from the mouths of these poor children. If one did, the Lord Director would take away their lunch money and make them go hungry until evening.

My brother gave me lunch money every day. When I ate lunch I used to go to the bazaar, buy half a loaf of bread and some halvah and eat it; I washed it down with water.

Unfortunately, one day I said to my friend Hashym: "Hashym, did you know that our neighbors had a feast last night? Gypsies played the tar and the shepherd's flute."

This 'criminal conversation' caught the attention of the lord director.
He came, smiling, and said: "Take out everything you have in your pockets!"

Since I was defenseless that day, by way of punishment I contributed my lunch money to the lord director. And the fresh bread and halvah remained in my heart.

We had a teacher whom we respected. He taught arithmetic. He paid no heed to the director's order and spoke to us in Azeri. The lord director did not trust him. I remember that once the teacher came into the classroom and said to one of the children: "Mehdi, stand by the door and, if the director comes, block the door."

Mehdi went to the vestibule and leaned against the door. Then the teacher posed us a question to answer: "A grocer bought 3 batmans of vinegar at 6 grana apiece. He added an additional 3 batmans of water to them and stirred...Then he sold it at 16 grana per batman. You calculate how great the grocer's profit was!"

With this, the teacher smiled and added: "Certainly, children, you could not learn such knowledge from a grocer!"

The bell started the class. Fortunately the door was blocked and the lord director did not appear.

Mirzali Mo'juz: "You Are That and I Am This," YOLDASH, No 4

[Note: The following poem depends on an interplay between Farsi and Azeri. The Farsi words, which are left untranslated, have the same meanings as the Azeri words which are translated, but when an interplay is intended, the Azeri word will appear in quotation marks.]

My mother said "water" to me Not ab. "Sleep" she taught me in my childhood, Not Khab.

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The first time she gave me "bread" She did not say nan. From the beginning it was "pass the salt" not nämäkdan. My mother did not say äkhtär to me, She said "star." When water freezes do not say yäkhdi, my son: Say "ice." Say "snow," not barf. Do not say däst, say "hand" she said. She never said to me biya; She said "come." Well I remember on evenings of a summer day, When the sun went down in the garden, And the warmth was going away; "Come" she would say, "Your turn is next, my spoiled baby! "If you don't come, be careful: I'll comb your sister's hair slowly." She did not say "Biya shane zänäm bär säri to, Gar na yaye, be zanam shane khoheri to!" Even if rocks rain from the sky, You are that and I am this. You had a different mother; I had a different mother. I have another country, special to me. I have another language, special to my country. If you wish, we are brothers, and live in unity. We can go one road together, arm in arm--But you must not blow with a different wind; You should not view my existence and my people as inferior; Otherwise, when you speak harshly, you shame my people. The day will come, the page turned: if necessary, you will go.

Anon. "The Student and the Shahist Teacher," YOLDASH, No 4

## Student:

If you want, teacher, we'll reconcile ourselves to the situation; There is language on our tongue, but we will not speak it. Culture has covered the face of the new world: Come do not accuse us of laziness, we are working day and night!

# Teacher:

Do not doubt that everything has its reason; Your fluent sweet language is of use to the center. They have ordered that you learn the Farsi language. In the world Farsi is the sister of all languages.

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### Student:

O teacher, that strange language is very hard, we'll twist our tongues!
When talking in our native tongue, it's our habit to smile.
When we're insulted, our attitude changes.
I am not speaking out of disrespect.
Azeristan was our center: look at history!

### Teacher:

Truthfully, I am compelled to reject you rights.

In Khorasan everyone respects this language

And you must learn to please them.

If you reject what I say, the center will doubtless be separate!

[Photograph of cover of an Iranian Azeri publication showing a picture of Samad Vurghun, one of the leading writers in the AzSSR]

Häbib Sahir, "On the Book Zäbani Azarbaijan" ("The Language of Azerbaijan")

In Zäbani Azärbaijan, written by the philologist Särhäng Shuar a number of words such as gazan ('kettle'), tiyan ('cast-iron pot'), särchä ('sparrow'), sährä ('falcon'), supa ('oven; staff; height') and gurbagha ('frog') are selected as examples which "prove that the Azerbaijanis have been Tats since the time of Noah...and that the Ilkhans changed the language of these poor devils by the sword...

Establishment scholars, the Roshan Zemirs, the Murtuzis and those excellencies hobnobbing with Karing have confirmed it. By Allah!, and we will confirm it too.

In the book is written: 'frog' is Farsi. (We have no word for it, but the Farsis do.)

Milchäk ('fly, as in insect') is a baby mil ('knitting needle; rampart; skeleton key; pivot; mile').

Banlamag ('to crow like a rooster') is bang vurmagh ('to smoke hashish').

Gazancha ('a small kettle') is the child of the gazan ('kettle') and särchä ('sparrow') is the child of the sährä ('falcon').

Supa is a three-legged donkey!

Woe, I said woe! This person was a veritable river of science!...

While satisfying their desires, An ancestor mounted Mrs Gazan.

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Her hair hanging loose, Little Särhäng Shüar came along, And a beautiful little kettle was born. Remaining the size of the falcon's sister, A healthy winged child was born. It grew from day to day And became a useless sparrow.

A green insect with but one wing Buzzed, and a child was born. "Who are you, milchäk," I asked, "Which mil's child are you?" "Of Säyyid Hämzä and Zor Khan." I said: "Go away, you bastard! I mean, your mother was a whore."

It was fall, it rained,
The wind blew cold.
When the war-like rooster crowed,
Shuar said: "Don't smoke hashish!"
And the rooster abruptly cut off its voice.

I said to the frog: --"My boy,
You have sold yourself to a stranger.
You have splintered the stone of our lake."
He said: "No, no! I always
Croak in a Turkish lake."

You know nothing, my girl, of what is; Shüar writes in her book "When I was passing through Mamaghan I saw a large pitched tent. A donkey with three knees was grazing, Its body was big, its name was supa."

This place is the fortress of fire; The sparrow is the falcon's child. Yellow flowers in our garden Quickly open and quickly close. Where Särhäng the scholar is There is a donkey with three knees.

[Note: The prose and poem above are of a type considered to be untransferable into another language since it involves a string of puns based on absurdity. Parenthetic additions to the text represent an attempt to express what the author actually means, or seems to mean, in the view of the translator. The poem is masterfully constructed in Azeri; in English it retains its flavor, if not its style.]

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DISCUSSIONS ON ESTABLISHMENT OF AZERBAIJAN WRITERS AND POETS ASSOCIATION

Baku AZERBAYJAN in Azerbaijani No 1, 1980 pp 58-65

[Article: "Discussions at the First Meeting on the Establishment of an Azerbaijan Writers and Poets Association"; material submitted by Iranian journal SIRUS]

[Text] The first meeting on the establishment of an Azerbaijan Writers and Poets Association.

Close to 30 Azeri writers and poets were brought together by YOLDASH magazine in a provisional location on the 31st of Ferverdin at 4:00 pm: prior to the official calling to order of the official organization of the meeting, the great writer Sebahi read a prose poem which he had written in honor of Sehend. At 4:10 pm a chairman of the meeting was elected. The chief editor of YOLDASH, Huseyn Duzgun, spoke:

"For some of the writers we have invited here, it is the first time they have taken part in a meeting of the Iranian Writers' Union. Some could not come. We hope that they will be present at later meetings." Then, with the permission of the chairman of the meeting, he read a report of the YOLDASH magazine committee: "The reason for inviting you here, as noted in the invitations, is to conduct discussions pursuant to the foundation and organization of an Azerbaijan writers' and poets' association. Certainly, we have been unable to assemble all the progressive writers and poets in one place. We hope that, in the future, our friends of the pen will meet in one place, and that we participate in collective activities. Questions suggested for ongoing talks with our friends consist of the following:

1. To bring forth a major plan for the founding and organization of an Azerbaijan Writers' and Poets' Association, and to become known and active on a global standard; to determine how to reach different parts of the world through other languages, and to communicate with other progressive writers and organizations of the world, and with organizations defending writers' rights.

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- 2. The question of the defense of the honor of our literary heritage which was almost destroyed by the depredations wrought by the Pahlevi regime and, working tirelessly and wholeheartedly, to demonstrate activity in the realm of necessary literary works by means of different organs; to open the treasury of literature by means of esthetic translations.
- 3. The coming plan of the association is to spread among the people the concept of a toiling and working class, and to defend this idea; to declare unity with the rest of the toiling people of Iran; and, to distance ourselves from ideas which argue for every kind of accursed nationalistic or fanatical remedy.
- 4. To prepare reading texts in the mother tongue for the coming school year; also, to put simple popular scientific booklets into the hands of the people.
- 5. To acquaint the younger generation with the different representatives and movements of our past proud pedagogical and literary heritage, and to instill in them both a love and enthusiasm for, and a rational expectation, for this plan.
- 6. To communicate and disseminate the basic programs of our association in the Tehran dailies which publish in Farsi and, not being deceived by any of the extremist elements and, being faithful to our program, to defend ourselves from them.
- Of course, in these questions we have noted only represent a cross-section of those working at YOLDASH magazine. The basic question is creating cultural freedom which is, on a broad front, the active desire of workers today; insuring the freedom for the people to develop their own language and literature; the attainment of autonomy of Azerbaijan for the local people; bringing forth, in a new and progressive form, of an "Enjumenhayi Eyaleti ve Vilayeti" [autonomy] which was foreseen in the constitutional period; defending the rebellion of Azerbaijan in 1945 and our great leader, Pisheveri; and to give to the state some possibilities in keeping with the times for the granting of autonomy to Azerbaijan.

Certainly we, as a writers' association, should plan and carry out political questions more correctly. And, may we struggle for the peoples' interest on a contemporary front."

Such are the ideas of those working on YOLDASH magazine. In communicating the unity of the working peoples of all Iran, it is our goal to spread the single concept of the centuries-old continuity of the workers of the world among the Azeri workers.

We invite immediately writers and poets to inform us of your frank, illuminated and specialized observations on the questions we have

selected; that you meet with our comrades to take note of our first meeting and that we gather up all our comrades in one place by setting up the fundamental statement and the program, the organization of our continuing meetings and other organs, and that you mention the need for efficient and useful meetings in Tabriz, the capital of Azerbaijan, and other cities.

When the chief editor of our magazine finished his speech, Aghayi Mehemmedeli Ferzane was next and, receiving permission from the chairman of the meeting, began thusly:

"...It is too bad that the workers at YOLDASH are so hard-line. Where are we in this movement? The revolution resulted in the freedom of the oppressed peoples of Iran. Every revolution throws something to one side. The question of using it is important. The atmosphere of the meeting is a step forward for Azeri linguistics and language. National and cultural autonomy has been planned for a long time. In the constitutional revolution, especially, autonomy was the goal and certainly this work is not yet over; we know how great the role of this desire was. The question of change in a revolution is major. After Russia in 1917, a number of events occurred in the Middle East. In Azerbaijan there was the Khiyabani uprising, which was manifested quite openly. The question of cultural, administrative and political autonomy was rejected. But, in today's context we are examining the cultural question more broadly. Culture was a component part of our language, theatrical, musical and literary life.

Whether put on a legal basis or not, when we examine this question thoroughly, we see what the compelling national question is. The question of textbooks and the question of an academy remain. For the last 30 years there has been a higher school in Azerbaijan—a small step—but no questions pertaining to the language of Azerbaijan were raised.

In publishing there was a roughly 10-page booklet on some poet from Kirman, but there was no mention of Azeri culture or vocabulary.

In the capitalist countries of Europe the higher schools are budgeted by the state. Concerning this, one of the special questions is that budgeting must be submitted to the people.

I am basically in agreement with the question which the YOLDASH press rejected, but if we must live with a lesser plan, where shall we begin? Today, everyone wants a dictionary or a lexicon. While this was necessary earlier, now it is paramount. Our theater began before any other in Iran, entering the scene 80 years ago. Theater depicts all stages of struggle, politics and man. It is different from all other realms.

I do not favor writing every mode in a beautiful way. We have our present-day language, and the language of Baku is not a model for us. While remaining faithful to the literary rules of the language, one should write more simply.

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...In broadcasts from Tabriz, they say we have everything. But the party chief stated that we have nothing and that we are beginning from the beginning.

They are underevaluating our publishing and cultural level. The association must begin to work from the beginning. If an economic-social situation arises so that we return to our homeland, we will benefit from these questions.

There is a great deal of slackness in political ideas and letters to the extent that every faction rejects every other faction other than itself, although our question is a general question, both by the standards of Iran and by the standards of Azerbaijan.

Since our language has been confused with politics, and since these politics were condemned, the language was also condemned. We must prevent this circumscription on our language and literature in the future.

A poets' and writers' association must not limit itself, nor must it remain in the framework of any other faction. And since it is known that it is on the side of the workers, all of the workers are completely behind us.

### Current cultural thrust:

- 1. To be democratic.
- 2. That the wishes of the majority be realized, and that there should be room for individual differences. Here, the classes and class question occupy a strong position. It is also necessary to unite with the "Enjumen-i Azerbayjan" [Azerbaijan Association]. If too few writers are being found for the association, we must find more."

Then Aghayi Rehim Degig, litterateur and writer, began his talk by thanking YOLDASH magazine for this effort, and said:

"To love the fatherland, in other words, to love the language. If we do not try to develop the language, that language will remain and go on anyway. But nothing happens without a cause. The language and its origin must be studied and the more than 800-year-old literature of our people be revived. When our brave descendants began this struggle, slander was hurled at them.

It is not sufficient to write in dialect these days. We must write in our literary language, but in a simplified form.

They insult us, who call us "Turk." Our language is not the Turki remaining from the Mongols. Research shows that our language is a strong and cultivated language. Nationalists, in order to colonize us, connect us to Turkey.

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The propositions presented by YOLDASH magazine are in conformity with the present. We are able to write down our demands on it as a program for the future. Our friend Aghaji Ferzane says not to write the language of Northern [Soviet] Azerbaijan. I repudiate this. We must write a literary and correct language. If we pay attention well, we see that there have been great poets in history, but when they got the idea of freedom, they were eliminated by slander.

We must make use of the freedom we have obtained with moderation. I commend YOLDASH magazine and I want the committee to form quickly, and that we give our choices to them."

Then one of our contemporary poets, Aghaji Ferhad spoke thusly:

"We have remained behind in this work and fell into a footnote. We say we woke up quickly, but what voice is this? There are many who have observed the work of the Kurdish peoples on this matter, who live next to us. I am not very knowledgeable. We must profit from the knowledge of those with a lot of experience. We construct the building before we bring home the bride, then, we work out the flaws. There are a number of writers who are not here; we hope that we can bring them to a larger meeting in the future. A standing committee should be formed so that we can resolve these questions at coming meetings."

Then Dr Mehrivani spoke: "I am glad to participate in this association. If I cannot speak literary Turki, it proves that it was tyrannized. I learned the language when it was not permitted, especially under the Pahlevi regime. But it is not only cultural tyranny, but also perhaps socioeconomic and political."

Then Dr Mehrivani reminisced, and then said: "Aghaji Sedig (the penname of Huseyn Duzgun) wants and expresses an ideology. I agree with Aghaji Ferzane.

I have a request for textbooks, that they not be written in the literary language. The people must be satisfied with the language. The book written by the late Semed Behrengi is good; it teaches Farsi by means of shared words."

After Mehemmedbaghyr Sedri Mehrivani, our contemporary writer Aghaji Gendzheli Sebahi said: "As a result of the Zionist fascist policy, not only was the language of Azerbaijan banned, but also Kurdish and Baluchi. I wrote a book called 'Epics of Azerbaijan.' They said that our constitution does not authorize the publication of books in the Azeri, Baluchi or Turkish languages.

It is just that it must destroy the language of a nation. YOLDASH magazine understands this because they thought of the same idea. But why have they brought up such a wide sector, such as entering into political

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questions? In my opinion the writers' association must be organized independently, even if it is good or not to take help from a party or committee organization."

After Aghaji Sebahi, Comrade Hesen Ildyrym, an honorary member of the writer's committee, spoke. He said, in the course of sharp discussions: "Never say that to crush the Azeri, Kurdish and Turkmen peoples is, in itself, a social question. It is the work of the bourgeoisie. If this is what it wants, it must dominate. It is that that crushes them. We are not extirpating culture from memory. No, although you should know that oral culture is in the mouth of the people. This is because the school does not bring forth literature. Come, look to the village where a perceptive girl reads the poetry of complaint of such bitterness in the course of her work. Literature and language are inseparable from the people."

After Hesen Ildyrym, Aghaji Khomenbeh. He said, in brief, that from the geographical point of view, the population of Azerbaijan is very large. There are 14 million Azerbaijanis in Iran. They communicate in the Azeri language in the Khemse region and in a number of places in Gilan and Khorasan. He said, after pointing to Semed Behrengi: "Semed wrote that book that said teach Farsi under any circumstances. Now we have to write a new book. Because times have changed."

Aghaji Mehemmedeli Ferzane, being recognized again by the chairman of the meeting, may speak. The chairman of the meeting has recognized Aghaji Ferzane. Ferzane: "Look, one question stands very easily. We are approaching a little bit of science. The revolution is a revolution of the petit-bourgeois. This is the characteristic of this revolution. Certainly, the working class stands by their ideology. If we make an accord with the proletariat, the petit-bourgeoisie will be split. Iran will become a polarized society.

None of those present are either in the forefront or the periphery of ideology. The general thrust of our present revolution must be democratic and national. In my opinion there must be an Azerbaijan writers' association. Otherwise we must say that it must be a writers' association of the Azerbaijan democratic party, or the writers' association of a freedom-loving party. This should not be. At this stage, the program of the Azerbaijan writers' association should be both democratic and national. Were a democratic government to rule in Azerbaijan, there would be maybe 55 or 56 factions. In such a loose situation, it is desirable that these should unite. (Association said: Yes, yes, yes!) It would be well for YOLDASH magazine to drop its approach. Perhaps one should take a poll so that there is no argument, but there are controversies at this meeting. One spots those who are radicalized and those who were tortured. Every democratic Azerbaijani is their companion."

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Then contemporary poet Hashym Terlan began to speak: "I find it very pleasant to be at this meeting organized by YOLDASH magazine. The association must be set up, and whatever the progressive movement, the path of YOLDASH magazine is good, because we must have our writings and books in our own language. We cannot stay on the edge of a legal and progressive movement. Tomorrow is May Day. We cannot remain silent. Whatever happens, we will organize a writers' association, and we just do not take this into consideration. We must make use of all progressive factions."

Then, lecturer at Tehran University, Aghaji Naghy Beraheni said: "We should not confuse the question that Aghaji Ferzane raised. A certain amount of thought is necessary. If legal nations made a decree on language, there would be the possibility to defend it. Our association is literary. Unfortunately, Azerbaijanis are behind in this respect. I have not seen any information published to the effect that the Azerbaijanis want self-rule. The young sometimes express the idea that their language is Farsi, but let us dwell on this. If we begin on two fronts, a number of means are necessary. There is no dictionary. A word list should be written, and a language law, in simple language, should be prepared. If we can, we will prepare three or four books in Farsi to entice the reader.

Aghaji Sadigi has worked much in the realm of the children's book. "If the society holds (an election) on the constitution soon, the differences will be eliminated."

The Aghaji Dzhamel Rovsi, communications, general and administrative director and financial manager of our magazine said "I say to all those who accuse YOLDASH of taking a hard line—the fate of our people has not fallen into the hands of opportunists. Why do we not hear from toilers and workers? Today, in Iran, a major economic movement has begun. And the working class is in that movement."

"America will not neglect Iran so easily. Now our people have recourse to what they wish, and may they escape the reactionary road of the economic movement in Iran. At YOLDASH the difficulty is recognized. You cannot pull a yearling down another road by taking advantage of the people. A man must keep his word. The people must go down a level road. We will no longer give the chance for opportunistic men to betray the people. Last night the Kurdish people revolted. Although the Tabriz bourgeoisie and petit-bourgeoisie remained silent or they spoke against it: What do you hear, and what will you do? Neriman Nerimanov says that there are very few who serve the people with a pure heart. We do not want these alms. If you work for us, we are satisfied, but no more."

"...I suggest on behalf of the workers at YOLDASH that, after electing a provisionary committee, we invite our writers from Tehran and other cities, and that the writing man is able to write in his mother tongue at

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all times. Many have grumbled at the language used in YOLDASH magazine, although putting it into practice has put everyone on their toes."

"We wish, then, for an association to be founded and organized. The goal is not that we gather all the counterrevolutionary and reactionary bourgeoisie writers in one place. For example, we organized the Azerbaijan Association. But if this idea has occurred to some at YOLDASH magazine, I will resign today."

"The revolution in Iran is a trivial question. In an interview I gave 8 months ago I said that it would pave the way for reaction..."

Then Aghaji Ferzane once again spoke, and attacking YOLDASH magazine, said that it writes about revolutionaries and struggles together with the Tudeh party. Here the chief editor of our magazine said, in a strong voice, that these two factions were not enemies of each other! Aghaji Ferzane sat down and he was answered by Aghani Degig: "You speak about 'democratic' with embellished words. There is no point in speaking. Action is necessary, not words. Workers and farmers are the heart of the people, and writers and poets must observe them. We have to talk about what benefits the majority. We have to show the way to achieve the goal by writings from our own hands, for 70 years ago our heroes wanted democracy. We are continuing along the sacred road of the goal of our ancestors. Now the Kurds want freedom. We will not waste words. We shall elect seven people, and they shall write our constitution."

Then Aghaji Hesen Medzhidzade (Savalan) said: "I appreciate very much that there is a hearth (guild) for my native language. That is to say, the bringing-into-being of the hearth (guild). The hearth gives hope to all of us in the sense that it defends and gives refuge. We must make a decision on our textbooks. It is not necessary to copy from Farsi and Turkic texts. I would like to ask our learned friends who are present that they declare their readiness."

Ferhad—one of our contemporary poets—said: "To resolve the contradictions among the people does not mean that we are talking about minor contradictions. These arguments here should not be pedestrian. The line of YOLDASH magazine is well appreciated, because the word of every faction is productive, and all freedom—lovers and democrats have been gathered in one place. And you cannot have this kind of altercation."

After ending the discussions, the chairman of the meeting, Dr Selamullah Dzhavid spoke. He admonished those members who were impatient, and then spoke of the downfall of the Pahlevi dynasty.

At 7:00 pm there was a recapitulation by the chairman of the committee, and seven members of a provisory executive committee were elected.

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LIBYA

LIBYAN OPPOSITION ABROAD IS BEGINNING TO ORGANIZE RANKS

Paris AL-WATAN AL-ARABI in Arabic 21-27 Jun 80 pp 30-31

[Article: "The Bloody Dialogue Between Qadhdhafi and His Opposition; Europe Gets Involved and the Arabs Are Sad and Distressed."]

[Text] London--The intense battle between Qadhdhafi and his opposition outside the country is about to run into a bloody tragedy involving several European regimes.

At last, the British government got up its courage and ordered Mr Musa Kusa (32 years old), head of the Libyan diplomatic mission in London, to leave the country because he was accused of "threatening to murder 2 Libyans residing in London."

Ian Gilmore, British Assistant Foreign Secretary, relayed the news to the parliament. This measure was well received by members of the left and the right.

A statement by the head of the Libyan People's Bureau had been published on the front pages of the British newspapers. In it, the two concerned persons were described as thieves and corrupt individuals.

After Mr Kusa stressed that he does not like to break the law, he threatened that "the popular committees would work with the Irish army to drive the British out of Northern Ireland." He said that the British government is wrong in its belief that the Libyan People's Bureau in London is used as a refuge for murderers. He also said that the revolutionary courts and committees are spread through the United Kingdom and that they include Arabs and British blacks.

Her Majesty's government took seriously this undiplomatic combative language, and issued a warning to 139 diplomatic missions in the United Kingdom, against transporting weapons in diplomatic pouches.

Naturally, the usual Libyan reaction was not late to come. The British Foreign Office reported that a gasoline bomb was thrown at its embassy in

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Tripoli on the same day that Musa Kusa was expelled from Britain. Following this, the British ambassador to Libya, Michael Eads, was summoned to the Libyan Foreign Ministry where he heard the threat that certain measures will be taken against the 5000 British citizens living in Libya.

Britain has exported 250 million pounds worth of goods to Libya in the past year. During the first 4 months of the current year, British exports to Libya increased by 52 percent, but the tension between the 2 countries will deprive Britain of Libyan contracts and transactions estimated at 2 billion pounds sterling.

Why Did Libyan actions Contradict Each Other?

There were contradictory stories about the true position of President Qadhdhafi on whether to resume operations to liquidate "corrupt" [Libyans] outside the country or not. In his recent statements and declarations, President Qadhdhafi called upon the revolutionary courts and committees to stop the physical liquidation of the Libyans who refused to return home by l1 June last year. But he excluded those who are collaborating with the U.S., Israel and Egypt, and called for the relentless pursuit of these.

At the time when President Qadhdhafi was informing the heads of the diplomatic missions of his decision, two Libyans were killed by his men in Italy. This incident caused confusion in the European capitals.

British observers believe that what they call the contradictory Libyan measures against the opposition outside the country is an indication that the Libyan regime has lost control over the revolutionary courts and committees which have become centers of power which bypass the regime's instructions at time.

Other observers believe that the contradictions in Libyan statements is intended to lead the opposition to abandon necessary protective measures on the assumption that President Qadhdhafi has pardoned them. This, according to observers, facilitates hunting them down. It is possible that this explanation is what prompted the British, German and Italian authorities to take additional measures for the pursuit of Qadhdhafi's supporters and for the protection of those who oppose him.

In fact, the western world does not want to enter a battle of confrontation with President Qadhdhafi, because of the Libyan oil and attractive Libyan contracts. At the same time, however, the European capitals do not want their streets and public places to become arenas for killings and manhunts.

Objections of the western governments are mainly concerned with the manner of diplomatic relations. What really confuses the west are the people's bureaus which replaced the diplomatic missions.

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British foreign office circles say that President Qadhdhafi's men, who replaced the professional diplomats, are asking for diplomatic privileges, but do not want to play the diplomatic game properly.

AL-WATAN AL ARABI has learned that Britain, West Germany and the U.S. have formally informed Libya that this abnormal situation should end, and that the Libyan government should abide by the 1961 Vienna agreement which requires foreign governments to submit the names of their ambassadors to host nations for approval. A list of the names of other diplomatic assistants should also be submitted.

A Shock of Distress and Sadness for the Arabs

Musa Kusa never used the language of diplomacy. His statements and threats caused a shock of distress and sadness among the Arab diplomats here. A young Arab diplomat told me that he knows this Kusa who is a graduate of Michigan University in the U.S. with a degree in social studies. The topic of his thesis was the social program of Qadhdhafi.

The Arab diplomat added that Musa Kusa could have been more flexible for he was dealing with a nation that is deeply rooted in political and diplomatic traditions and in respect for the opinion of the opposition. The Arab diplomat also said that the Arabs are in need of winning British public opinion at a time when the Arab issues are in dire need of pressure by European public opinion on European governments.

We are faithfully reporting the opinion of the young diplomat, and we leave it up to the Libyan president and his government to size up the situation. Every Arab who gets killed by Arab bullets in any European street lowers the European opinion of the Arabs as a civilized people with a heritage of human traditions.

President Qadhdhafi's supporters here say that the British government is taking a hostile stand against them and the Jamahiriyah regime, and that it is encouraging the Libyan opposition to work on overthrowing the Libyan regime and to destroy the third international theory which it created. They add that they are determined to anihilate the opposition.

This sums up the deteriorating situation between Qadhdhafi and his opposition outside the country on one hand, and between Qadhdhafi and the European governments on the other hand. But what about the domestic Libyan front?

Developments of the Internal Situation

According to information available to the Libyan opposition here, a major campaign of arrests has been launched in the past few months and a number of arrested people have been liquidated. The most prominent of these were Mr 'Amir Tahir al-Daghis and Hasan al-Saghir. The body of the first was delivered to his family four days after his arrest. The authorities

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said that he had committed suicide in prison. The body of Hasan al-Saghir was delivered to his family a few weeks after his arrest.

The present situation in Libya resembles the situation in China during the cultural and social revolution in the mid sixties. That revolution, according to Chinese leaders today, caused a regression of several generations and destroyed the economy, the industry and the future of young men who quit learning to get involved in the struggle for power.

Under the al-Jamahiriyah regime, state machinery was dissolved. The president himself resigned and his title became "the brother leader of the revolution." He says that he is devoting himself to revolutionary work and thinking. The revolutionary committees are playing the role of the famous "red guard." But confusion prevails, so that these committees do not know where their functions begin or end, nor where the functions of the administrative system begin or end.

Between Planning and Execution

President Qadhdhafi says that he wants to create an industrial and agricultural nation which is capable of standing on its feet when the oil dries up. He allocated for this goal the equivalent of 263 billion dollars to be spent over a period of 20 years. The plan is based on building a series of hydrocarbon industries.

However, the problems lies in execution. Nine percent of the labor force in industry is Libyan and 20 percent of the labor force in agriculture is Libyan. There are 32,000 Europeans, 100,000 Egyptians and 70,000 Pakistanis and Turks working in Libya.

But the local Arab and foreign labor force is not enough to meet the demands of his ambitious projects. Add to that the fact that skilled and trained labor has been leaving the country since the beginning of the cultural revolution. The situation further deteriorated during the first half of the current year.

Most of the sectors have been hit with crises for several reasons such as government paralysis, administrative chaos, lack of responsibility and the failure of the authorities to make the right decision at the right time in fear of punishment.

As an example, according to Libyans who recently arrived from Libya, the cost of marketing grain from production centers in the south to consujption centers in the north has multiplied, while the relocation plan of city people in the north to the south, in order to alleviate the water crisis, has run into obstacles.

In the field of industry, productivity has dropped due to the departure of skilled labor. It is enough to say that the methanol factory which was

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opened recently was in operation for 20 days only, while work in most of the other factories does not exceed 30 or 50 percent of capacity.

Also, shortages in foodstuffs developed when small businesses and private companies and institutions including lorry trucks were confiscated.

What made things worse was a large-scale campaign of arrests, television and public trials, and group executions. Abroad, there were unsuccessful adventures in Tunisia, Uganda (400 Libyans killed and 200 captured), Chad and Central Africa.

No Threat to the Regime, but...

Does this mean that the regime is in an immediate danger?

Those arriving from Libya do not see an immediate threat to the regime, due to the lack of an organized opposition movement and due to the enthusiastic support of sectors of the new generation which is receiving concentrated and guided instruction. President Qadhdhafi is now reaping the benefits of his investment in this generation during the past eleven years. Among this generation, there is attachment to the good qualities and personality of "the inspired leader" and his easy simplified theory.

Some people believe that no one, not even those who are close to Qadhdhafi understand the complicated structure of his political organization with all its interrelated levels from the summit to the base and visa-versa.

While the administrative and political systems were dissolved, and the opposition was fully dispersed and pursued, multiple intelligence systems were built to make it easy to observe any opposition moves from all angles and in depth in this small desert country.

Libyans say that there is a secret opposition inside the army which has been subjected to a series of purges and liquidation. The Libyan president depends for his personal security on a trained brigade whose formation was completed last year. This brigade is mostly composed of men from men of his native al-Qadhdhafah tribe.

President Qadhdhafi spends most of his time in the desert in a tent reading, writing and thinking. This inspiration is channeled for execution through the revolutionary committees and the security systems.

The Opposition Outside the Country

There is one explanation for the intensity of the pursuit of Libyans outside the country. In Qadhdhafi's view, it is they who constitute a threat to his radical regime. They include businessmen, financiers, lawyers, students, officers and politicians. Some of them were at one time supporters and partners of Qadhdhafi in his revolution.

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These are now saying that they do not need money, but that they lack organization. The physical liquidations took them by surprise, but most of them got out of sight to make contacts for the purpose of organizing a unified opposition movement which would have muscle and influence in the country.

"Life is dear and is the most precious gift from God. It is a legitimate right to defend oneself." This is what a Libyan from the opposition told us in justification of what the opposition might do. The opposition today does not only aim at organizing ranks, but has also started to take protective and revengeful measures.

Some opposition groups have started organizing small commando units which include Libyans, Arabs and foreigners, especially Corsicans who are famous for hit and run operation.

I asked him, this opposition Libyan: "What is the purpose of all this. Is it not enough to organize a political opposition?"

The young Libyan, who opposes the regime but was at one time a close admirer of the Libyan president, said: "Would you like to see my dead body one day thrown in the street with my blood shining under the light of newspaper photographers' lenses, while my assassin is fondly shouting Qadhdhafi, Qadhdhafi?"

The man was silent for a while and then added: "This could happen. I might be killed one day by Qadhdhafi's bullets, but the bullets of our men will also reach those who are in the embassies of al-Jamahiriyah trying to guide liquidation and assassination operations, believing that no one knows them or is watching them."

These are some aspects of the bloody crisis which involves the regime in al-Jamahiriyah and which is about to involve the opposition.

Only one man can stop the storm which is about to begin. This man is President Qadhdhafi. One signal from his could stop the bloodshed. He can also conduct his battle with the opposition in the proper way. This way is to compete to win the hearts and minds of three million Libyans who hope that the oil wealth will bring them peace, security, luxury and tranquility.

This could be the real challeng? facing President Qadhdhafi's regime, his green book and his third theory.

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TUNISIA

### BOURGUIBA MEETING WITH DETAINEES EXAMINED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 18 Jun 80 p 23

[Article by Souhayr Belhassen: "Bourguiba Says No to Torture"]

[Text] That President Bourguiba would set free 27 detainees on the eve of the Victory holiday (1 June) and offer a palliative, is not very surprising. He has always demonstrated, and he confirms it, that exercising (or non-exercising) of public liberties is a function of its appreciation. It is also not very astonishing that the chief of state wished to meet five of these young discharged prisoners. This happened many times in the past.

However, there is a difference. Formerly, Bourguiba admonished the beneficiaries of his generosity and would send them away saying: "Go, be good in the future!" What is remarkable this time is the freedom given to his interlocutors to express themselves. Particularly on two points.

To begin with, there is freedom of opinion and association. Bourguiba accepts the "idea," with immediate limits. A pluralism of parties? Would it be recognized? "There would be too many." New newspapers? It is not inconceivable, but you "can already express yourselves in ER-RAI and in DEMOCRACY (the opposition).

Torture, second point. "I do not support the idea of torture," Bourguiba burst out. The subject is tabu, if there was one. No one could ever have imagined that victims of long standing could open up and speak to the chief of state, going so far as to name their torturers. Neither could anyone ever have thought that Bourguiba would subscribe immediately to the suggestion made by the minister of the interior to proceed with an inquest. Moreover Bourguiba urged his guests to "report what he had said to the people." Undoubtedly the torturers will not disappear at a moment's notice. None will ever be able to claim that he is acting in the name of the state and its chief. This is quite an achievement.

Curiously enough, the president was astonished that such young men had remained in prison for such a long time: 5 years! (He who 25 years ago, by his triumphant return to Tunis, became a free man again, could not

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help but make the comparison). He even congratulated them for their love of their country and extended his best wishes for them to make their way in the world, if necessary, with the help of the state. Ignoring penal or administrative implications, he urged these students, who normally would be under simple conditional liberty, to go about the country and then take the road back to the faculties.

Sudden change of fortune? Certainly much more. To begin with, more than the prelude to a simple improvement in detention conditions which Tahar Belkhodja had tried previously when he had the interior portfolio, it would seem that the officialism of the liberalization policy opened by the Prime Minister Mohamed M'Zali can be observed in this regard. Actually (apart from the 18 condemned prisoners in Gafsa whose horrible conditions have been somewhat improved), about 15 political prisoners, of which two are union leaders (Ghorbal and Brour), remain in prison. When will they be liberated? And when will a real general ammesty be declared which would make it possible for all those who, at one time or another were the object of repression to regain their human rights. If it is not before, is it permissible to hope that it will happen at the beginning of August, at the time of the president's birthday. Through the hardships endured by these citizens for whom he showed so much understanding and compassion, Bourguiba will grow in stature.

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TUNISIA

OPPOSITION LEADER MESTIRI AUTHORIZED TO PUBLISH PAPERS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 16 Jul 80 p 33

[Article by correspondent Souhayr Belhassen: "Two Papers for Ahmed Mestiri"]

[Text] Ahmed Mestiri, former minister who is seen as an opposition leader, together with his friends requested 2 years ago authorization to form a Social Democratic Party. Although he has not received an answer to this request at least Ahmed Mestiri has received a positive reply to his secondary petition to publish two papers, one in Arabic and the other in French--AL-MOSTAQBAL and L'AVENIR.

Following the first congress of the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] held in Monastir in 1971, Ahmed Mestiri, who apparently had emerged victor in the contest, was to become the first important personality to be excluded from that party. Others, subsequently, were to break with the policy of the Tunisian Government and the PSD from which personalities such as Hassib Ben Ammar, Habib Boulares, and Beji Caid Essebsi were to be barred in turn. Together with Ahmed Mestiri and the young people who joined the group, they published their first joint position statements calling for the respect of public freedoms and more democracy. The "Mestiri" men, commonly called "liberals" and then members of the "socialist democratic movement," ended up by securing not without difficult, 8 years after breaking with the party, the establishment of a Tunisian League of Human Rights and the publication of the newspapers ERRAI and DEMOCRATIE against which lawsuits were pressed and the former of which was even barred for 3 months.

# Critical Position

The impact of the newspapers, the logic of the movement itself, the fact that some members including Ahmed Mestiri decided to jump the gun and break with the PSD by filing an application for the establishment of a [new] party evidenced splits within the "movement." Besides those who opt for the creation of a party there are those who, like Beji Caid

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Essebsi, continue to adopt a critical position with regard to the government, declare same, but do not hide the fact that if the regime should reform itself they are ready to serve it once more. On the other hand there are those who, like Hassib Ben Ammar, editor of ERRAI and of DEMOCRATIE, declare that they no longer wish to militate within an organized party.

The personality of each, the susceptibilities, the ambitions, and political calculations have not failed to weigh on these developments and even to create divergences among individuals linked by common goals at the start. The Gafsa events and the change of prime minister will clarify the situation a little more. Separately, each of the factions will pull the alarm bell in President Habib Bourguiba's ears and indicate its readiness "to consolidate the domestic front." To the head of state this means national unity symbolized by the PSD. He has thus lifted the ouster decrees against those former PSD members who did not for all that return to the party. One of them, Sadok Ben Jemaa, however accepted a portfolio while Mohamed Salah Belhadj ran on the electoral slate of his muncipality and was elected its mayor.

Accordingly, Hassib Ben Ammar explained, what was involved was "to grant a favorable bias for the new government team" to which his newspapers gave critical support, "at least for the first 100 days." Designated to become minister of justice, Beji Caid Essebsi on his part has expressed reservations concerning the fact that it was not possible to initiate a discussion about a new political orientation.

In the meantime, the "liberal" organs--which no longer have the monopoly of "expression" (with others competing seriously with them)--continue to form part of the public opinion of the "opposition papers." Hence the sizable mail which they receive, from people ranging from the president of the Destourian cell "frustrated of his rights" to the leftist student, and the moral support--some financial support too--which enables them to balance their budget. For these newspapers must live without advertising revenues.

# Annoyances

ERRAI runs 25,000 copies and DEMOCRATIE, 7,000. Annoyances continue such as the persisting impossibility which they find in having access to modern printing presses. But at least summer is a boom period when sales increase. However, the competition threatens to become harsher and harsher, for the Tunisian Communist Party has also renewed its application to publish AL-JADID and LE RENOUVEAU as has the Popular Unity Movement of Ahmed Ben Salah.

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